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This thesis offers an analysis of Plato’s Meno, in which the Greek philosopher 
addresses more directly than in any other dialogue the character of human virtue. 
Believing that Plato has considerable guidance to offer us in respect to the question of 
what virtue is, I attempt to approach his writing with considerable care and attention to 
the details and the structure of the argument. I argue that the dialogue ultimately presents 
a complicated teaching about virtue’s character, and the way that virtue comes to be 
present, which ultimately culminates in the claim that virtue is knowledge – and in the 
thoughtful consideration of the alternatives to, and the nuances of, that claim. 
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I. Introduction (70a - 71d4) 
 
At the beginning of our dialogue, Meno, a young, beautiful Thessalian, approaches 
Socrates, in order to ask him about virtue. Meno wants to know, is virtue something 
teachable? Or, if it is not teachable, is it acquired through practice? Or, if it is neither 
something learnable nor something acquired through practice, does it come to be present 
in us through nature, or through some other way (70a1-5)1? - As is clear on some 
reflection, all of these questions boil down to the one basic question of how virtue comes 
to be present. 
 
Now, while Meno gives no indication of how virtue might come to be present through 
some way "other" than nature (70a5), Socrates himself suggests an alternative at the end 
of the dialogue. For virtue might come to be present, not by nature, but by divine 
allotment (99e4-100a1). Thus, the dialogue's opening and ending together explicitly raise 
the question of whether the ultimate cause for virtue's coming-into-being is nature, or the 
Gods. And this question, with its pointer toward one of the fundamental questions of 
philosophy, will lay in the background of what will follow.  
 
                                                 
1 Plato, Protagoras and Meno, trans. Robert C. Bartlett (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2004). All quotations from or paraphrases of the Meno will be from this edition. 
Additionally, all unmarked parenthetical references will be references to line numbers of 
the Meno. For instance, "(70e1)" will refer to line 70e1 of the Meno. 
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Additionally, it is worth noting that Meno's opening question treats "learnable" and 
"teachable" as synonymous, thus suggesting that anything teachable is learnable, and 
anything learnable is teachable (70a1-4). Now, surely, anything teachable must be 
learnable. For if a thing is a taught, then there must be another by whom it is learned. But 
it is not so clear that everything learnable must be teachable. For something might be 
learned by oneself, without it being possible to teach it to another. And perhaps it is 
precisely in order to point toward some things that are "learnable," but not "teachable," 
that will lead Socrates to make a long and elaborate joke in response to Meno's questions 
(70a6-71a7). For that joke ultimately revolves around the assumption that Socrates has 
taught each Athenian that he or she is ignorant about virtue (71a1-7). But, of course, 
Anytus alone suffices to prove that premise's absurdity (89e6-95a1). Thus, if teaching the 
Athenians their ignorance is something that Socrates wants to do (as his final request to 
Meno suggests - 100b8-c1), then Socrates' ignorance about virtue, at least, may be 
something learnable, without being teachable.  
 
But Socrates will now invoke that very ignorance in order to deny that he knows how 
virtue comes to be present. For Socrates claims that he is so far from knowing how virtue 
comes into being, that he does not even know what in the world virtue itself is (71a3-
71b8). Of course, Socrates' claim here is highly paradoxical. For mustn't each of us have 
some awareness of what the word 'virtue' denotes? And doesn't that mean that we must 
have some knowledge of what virtue is, however obscure or confused? For if not, how 
could we even know enough about virtue to say that we do not know what it is? Perhaps, 
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then, Socrates knows more about virtue than he here lets on (86b8-86c2). But if that is the 
case, we are bound to also wonder whether he might also know more about how virtue 
comes to be present. - Of course, this isn't to deny that there may be some considerable 
truth to Socrates' claim that he does not know what virtue is. For Socrates may well not 
know that what is usually taken to be virtue is actually virtue at all; and this, at least for 
many listeners (Anytus, for example), might seem to be the same as to to deny that he 
knows what virtue is. 
 
But however that might be, Socrates will suggest that, not only does he not know what 
virtue is, but he has never met a single other person who seemed to him to know (71b9-
c7). But, in response to Meno's apparent surprise that Gorgias, at least, didn't know what 
virtue was, Socrates begins to moderate his claims (71c8-d1). Instead, he professes to 
have a "poor memory," and to be unable to recollect quite how Gorgias spoke. But, of 
course, if Meno can recollect what Gorgias said - for doubtless Meno shares his 
opinions... and from here, it is just a small step to lead Meno to say what he thinks that 
virtue is (71d1-3). 
 
Thus, Socrates has flipped around the argument of the Meno. For what began as Meno 
asking Socrates to explain how virtue comes to be present, has become Socrates asking 
Meno what virtue is. As for why Socrates wished to effect this change, perhaps we might 
explain it on the grounds that Socrates himself suggests. For of course, if we do not know 
clearly what virtue is, we will be unable to say how it comes to be present (71a3-71b8); 
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for, as the final sections of the dialogue will make clear, an obscurity in our 
understanding of what virtue is must necessarily affect our understanding of how it 
comes to be present. Perhaps, then, Socrates is simply trying to arrange things so that he 
and Meno might first inquire together about what virtue is, before going on to inquire 
about how it comes to be present (80c10-80d4; 100b2-7). Yet, this suggestion poses a 
few serious difficulties. For to begin with, Socrates likely knows far more about virtue 
than he is here letting on (86b8-c2). Likewise, given their disparity in wisdom, it is 
questionable how useful a Meno-Socrates partnership would actually be. Perhaps, then, a 
different explanation is needed. Yet, it seems to me that Socrates' ultimate motivation is 
hardly clearer in this dialogue than it is elsewhere; and so, perhaps answering this 
question would be more suitable in the context of inquiring into what motivates Socrates' 
dialectical examinations more generally - through an analysis of the Apology, say, or the 
Phaedo. For now, however, it is enough to note that Socrates has centered the dialogue 
on the question of what virtue is; and that this question, for the next few sections to come 








II. Meno's First Definition of Virtue (71d4 - 73c6) 
 
As the subtitle of our dialogue suggests, and as the introduction to that dialogue at once 
confirms, the Meno is about virtue. But, as we have already seen, the Meno is "about" 
virtue in two very different ways. For not only does it raise the question of how virtue 
comes to be present, but it also raises the more basic and fundamental question of what 
virtue is. Now, as we saw in what preceded, Socrates had set the stage for Meno to 
attempt to answer the second of these questions, and to say what virtue is. As for why 
Socrates himself is interested in that question, that seems to me to be difficult to say; but, 
for us - who are likely to be more ignorant than Socrates, and to therefore benefit from 
this discussion in a different way than Socrates himself - I would suggest that the 
following sections (71e1-79e4) are most helpful in addressing two different but deeply 
important themes of Platonic philosophy. For first, and most obviously, these sections 
will help to elucidate what virtue is. But, since virtue appears to be something 
preeminently good, and even to constitute one of the the chief objects of our desire, these 
sections will help to articulate precisely what it is that we yearn for, and that goal or those 
goals toward which all of our actions and our choices are directed. But, secondly, by 
reflecting upon the way that we come to know what a thing is (from 74b4 to 77a5, for 
instance), Socrates will also convey something of his general methodology, or the way 
that he approached the world, and sought to know the character of each of the beings. Of 
course, we may wonder how a discussion of Socrates' way of pursuing knowledge, which 
seem to be quite "theoretical" in character, really forms any part of Plato's dialogue on 
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virtue. But, perhaps the answer to that question will be provided later. For in what 
follows, Socrates will suggest that virtue is a sort of knowledge (87d7-89a6). But, if 
virtue is knowledge, then the question of how virtue comes to be present is identical with 
the question of how knowledge comes to be present. And this would mean that the 
dialogue's apparent "digressions" on how we come to know the character of the world 
(74b3-77a5; 80d5-86c2) would actually be the very answer to the question that Meno had 
originally raised. For even if they are not explicitly identified as such, they would 
actually provide the clearest account of how virtue comes to be present, precisely by 
saying how it is that knowledge comes into being. Thus, I would suggest that, in the 
sections that follow (71e1-79e4), the dialogue will focus entirely on the themes of what 
virtue is, and how knowledge comes to be present. Accordingly, it is with a view toward 
these two themes that my initial chapters will be focused (Chapters II through V). With 
that as an introduction, then, let us now turn directly toward Meno's first attempt to say 
what virtue is. 
 
According to Meno, it isn't difficult to say what virtue is (71d4-71e1). For, after all, there 
are many different human virtues. For the virtue of a man is to be capable of handling the 
affairs of the city; and, in handling them, to benefit friends, harm enemies, and take care 
that he not suffer any such thing himself (71e1-5); but, the virtue of a woman is to 
manage the household well by both preserving its contents and being obedient to the man 
(71e5-7). And so, too, is there a virtue of a child, and of a slave, and of an older man, and 
many other virtues as well; and so, there's no perplexity in speaking about what virtue is 
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(71e7-72a2). For the virtue belonging to each of us is related to each task appropriate to 
each action and time of life (72a3-4). And as it is with virtue, so too does it stand with 
vice (72a4-5). 
 
Socrates, however, is not especially satisfied by this answer. For in response to Meno's 
lengthy speech, he suggests that Meno may have given him a 'swarm' of virtues, but he 
has certainly failed to identify the one virtue that is common to them all (72a6-8). For as 
Socrates now makes clear, by asking what virtue is, he had wanted Meno to identify the 
form of virtue (72c6-72d1), or that one thing which makes each of the many and varied 
virtues a 'virtue,' through being present in each of the things we designate as 'a virtue' 
(72a8-72b7 with 72c6-d1). For to say that x and y are both virtues is to assert that there is 
some set of characteristics which, by being present in both x and y, makes each of those 
things 'a' virtue. (Or perhaps which, by its presence, allows the mind to recognize and 
abstract a single form of virtue; which form itself, then, goes on to become the true cause 
of both of the particulars x and y being cognized as 'a virtue,' rather than simply being the 
unclassified wholes of 'x' and 'y.' See 72c7-8, and what it suggests about the form as a 
cause.) But however that might be, it is certainly the case that, by asking Meno to say 
what virtue is, Socrates was asking Meno to say what single form is present within each 
of the things which he calls a virtue, or what characteristic(s) bind all of the things that he 
calls virtue together into a single class or kind. Hence, Socrates' dissatisfaction with 
Meno's answer seems to suggest that Meno has simply failed to say what virtue is. And it 
would seem that Meno had failed to give an answer to Socrates' question on the grounds 
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that he had enumerated a "swarm" of different virtues, rather than articulating the single 
form of virtue itself.  
 
Yet, if this is what Socrates intends, then it seems to me that Socrates' critique could not 
be a fair response to Meno's answer. For while Meno had certainly begun by providing an 
enumeration of the different kinds of virtues, he had also concluded his speech by stating 
that each virtue is related to the work that is appropriate to each action and time of life 
(72a3-4). And isn't this, at least, an answer to the question of what virtue is? For it is 
hardly a stretch to infer from Meno's statement here that he believes that virtue is doing 
one's own work well, or that it consists of successfully performing whatever task is 
appropriate for a given time of life. Thus, while Socrates' response would of course be 
adequate if Meno had only enumerated many different kinds of virtues, without at all 
providing a unifying principle, it would seem to be simply inadequate as a response to the 
answer which Meno actually gave.  
 
Now I believe that this is correct, and that Socrates' objection that Meno's answer 
provided a "swarm" of virtues cannot possibly be an adequate refutation if it is only 
meant to apply to Meno's enumeration of the different kinds of virtues. Hence, if Socrates 
has actually provided a valid critique of Meno's answer, then the multiplicity which 
Socrates has in mind must not be the enumeration of virtues which Meno had provided at 
the beginning of his response. For while Plato has doubtlessly led his readers to suspect 
that it is this "multiplicity" which is the target of Socrates' critique, Socrates himself does 
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not give any indication that this "multiplicity" is the one that he actually has in mind. But 
then, if Socrates is thinking of a different multiplicity, and if his response is sufficient as 
a refutation of Meno's first definition, then that multiplicity would have to be somehow 
present within Meno's articulation of the character of virtue itself. But what multiplicity, 
then, might Socrates have in mind?  
 
To begin to answer this question, let us return once more to Meno's actual definition of 
virtue. Now, as I suggested before, Meno's definition of virtue seems to amount to the 
claim that virtue is doing one's own work well. However, it is far from obvious how we 
determine what someone's work actually is, or Meno means by saying that each virtue is 
related to that action which is "appropriate" for a given person and a given time of life. 
Of course, in attempting to determine what leads Meno to judge that a particular action is 
"appropriate," it is reasonable to begin by considering why Meno judged that one action 
was "appropriate" to a man, while another was "appropriate" to a woman. For we might 
expect that these particular judgments to reveal Meno's broader understanding of what 
actions are and are not "appropriate" for a given person and a given time of life. Yet, I 
would suggest that just such a consideration may ultimately reveal that Meno is appealing 
to one principle in determining the work that is "appropriate" to a man, and another in 
determining the work that is "appropriate" to a woman. But this in turn would mean that 
it is a multiplicity within the use of the word appropriate, that gives rise to the deepest 
"multiplicity" within Meno's account of the character of virtue.  
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For to begin with the case of a man, the virtue of a man is simply said to be the capability 
to manage the affairs of the city (71e2-5)2. Now, in a later exchange, Socrates will 
suggest that, whenever the desire to exercise a capability is common to all, then it is 
sufficient to define virtue as that capability alone, without reference to the desire (78b3-
11). And I would suggest that the same thought is present here. For by identifying the 
virtue of a man with a certain capacity, without specifying that any desire needs to be 
present for that capacity to be actualized, Meno seems to suggest that every man wants to 
manage the affairs of the city. (For as Meno will make abundantly clear, he, at least, 
wants to have power within the cities - 73c7-9; 78c4-78d2). Thus, at least part of the 
"virtue of a man" is having the capacity to do what each of us most deeply desires; which 
means, in turn, that the action which is appropriate to the man is the action that satisfies 
his own desires. But, by contrast, a woman's work seems to be determined with reference 
to the desires of the man. For as Meno's definition makes quite clear, a virtuous woman is 
one who serves the desires of her husband (71e5-7). Hence, in this case, the action that is 
appropriate to the woman is the action that satisfies another's desires. But then, Meno 
seems to determine the work of a man and the work of a woman by recourse to two very 
different principles. For in the case of the man, what is "appropriate" is what serves his 
own desires; while, in the case of the woman, what is "appropriate" is what serves the 
desires of another. But, while he indicates that each of these different principles can 
                                                 
2 In the analysis which follows, I have somewhat simplified Meno's actual 
definition in order to better bring out the true contrast between his definition of the virtue 
of a man and his definition of the virtue of a woman. However, I should add that there 
may also be traces of something "justice-like" in his definition of the virtue of a man; and 
these will be discussed at a later point in my commentary.  
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determine what action is "appropriate," he is completely silent on what unites the two 
together - or how both the virtue of a man, and the virtue of a woman, are correctly called 
by the name of "virtue." Hence, Meno's articulation of virtue does contain a truly 
problematic multiplicity - if not the multiplicity that might first have caught our eye. 
Hence, in rejecting Meno's definition, Socrates seems to be gesturing both toward the 
superfluousness of Meno's enumeration of the virtues, while more quietly hinting towards 
the deeper "multiplicity" that is present even within Meno's more universal statement of 
what virtue is3.  
 
Now, in the aftermath of this critique of Meno's first definition of virtue, Meno will begin 
to waiver about whether there actually is a single form that is common to both the virtue 
of a man and the virtue of a woman (72d2-73a4). But Socrates, for his part, will attempt 
to draw forth Meno's belief that there is a single form of virtue. For first, Socrates will 
ask whether anyone - a man or a woman, a slave or a child - could ever be virtuous, if 
they are not both moderate and just (73b1-15). For his part, Meno will say that they 
cannot: no one can be virtuous without being both moderate and just (73b1-15). But then, 
Socrates concludes, virtue must be the same for all human beings: for in each case, to be 
virtuous is to be moderate and just (73c1-2).  
 
                                                 
3 This account of the hidden "multiplicity" within Socrates' definition is greatly 
indebted to: Christopher Bruell, On The Socratic Education: An Introduction To The 
Shorter Platonic Dialogues (Lanham, MD: Rowman And Littlefield, 1999), 172-173. 
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But, of course, this argument is highly problematic. For even if being moderate and just is 
a necessary condition for being virtuous, that surely does not imply that it is a sufficient 
condition. For one might lack the capability to rule a city, for instance, or to manage a 
household, even if one is both moderate and just. Now, we might try to save Socrates' 
argument here by claiming that Socrates is not trying to provide a definition of virtue, or 
trying to say that being virtuous is to be moderate and just, but that he is only attempting 
to accomplish a more basic task. For, in what has come before, Socrates has never said 
that there is a single form of virtue; or even, for that matter, that there are a multiplicity 
of virtues at all. Rather, his entire discussion has been an examination of Meno's views - 
who certainly does believe that there are many distinct virtues - and not a statement of his 
own. Thus, perhaps Socrates is only attempting to perform the more basic task of proving 
that there is a unity amongst the virtues, in order to secure Meno's further attempts to 
articulate what that unity is.  
 
Yet, I believe that even if we measure Socrates' attempts against this more limited goal, 
we still must conclude that his attempts are not successful. For even if Meno agrees that 
every person must be just and moderate in order to be virtuous, aren't justice and 
moderation themselves two separate virtues? But then, even if Socrates has secured 
Meno's agreement that these two things must be present in each and every virtue,  
Socrates would have only pushed back the question of the unity of virtue a single step. 
For instead of being confronted with the question of whether there is any unity amongst 
the virtue of a man and the virtue of a woman, we would instead be confronted with the 
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question of whether there is any unity amongst the virtue of justice and the virtue of 
moderation. Thus, Socrates would have only succeeded at deepening the initial difficulty, 
by showing that even the claim that justice and moderation are both virtues necessarily 
points toward the need to identify a single form of virtue, which each of them must share 
in common. Perhaps, then, Socrates' goal here was not so much to prove that there is a 
unity of virtue, as to deepen the difficulty of discovering for ourselves what that unity 
consists in.  
 
However that might be, it seems certain to me that Socrates has made it more clear why 
the question of the unity of virtue is relevant to our own views and opinions. For while 
few of us today would be likely to agree that an excellent woman is radically different 
from an excellent man, we are likely to agree that there are many different kinds of 
human excellence - justice, for instance, and courage, and wisdom, and prudence. But, it 
is hard to see what each of these virtues must share in common, or what we could 
possibly mean by claiming that each of them is a virtue, or is something that makes us 
excellent. Thus, whatever Socrates' deepest intention here might be, he has surely 
succeeded at making clear the perplexities and riddles associated with the view that there 
are a multiplicity of virtues; and it is precisely with a view toward attempting once more 
to resolve those riddles, and to discover the true articulation of the form of virtue, that the 




III. Meno's Second Definition of Virtue (73c7 - 74b2) 
 
Having left us with these difficulties and riddles to consider, Socrates will now ask Meno 
whether he is able to say what virtue is, or to articulate that one virtue that is the same in 
all (73c7-8). But, in response, Meno will now offer the second of his three definitions of 
virtue, while making a truly considerable change to his previous definition of virtue. For 
now, Meno will claim that virtue is nothing other than the capacity to rule over human 
beings (73c9-d1). And this means that Meno now implicitly denies that any non-ruling 
class – women, children, and slaves, for instance -  can have virtue at all (73d2-6). We 
might say, then, that Meno has been led by Socrates' earlier critique to abandon the 
multiplicity of virtue entirely, and to identify what was peculiar to the virtue of a man 
with the essence of virtue simply. But, to say even this much would overlook just how 
radically Meno has transformed his original definition. For while I had suggested before 
that the virtue of a man had been determined simply with reference to satisfying one's 
own desires, while the virtue of a woman had been determined simply with reference to 
satisfying the desires of another, I believe that that account may have been something of 
an oversimplification of the virtue of a man. For I believe that that virtue had at least 
contained traces of the notion that serving others is what constitutes human virtue. For in 
that definition, at least, virtue was not merely the capacity to rule, but the capacity to 
carry out the affairs of the city (71e2-5). Likewise, by explicitly connecting the virtue of 
a man with helping friends and harming enemies, Meno suggests a certain connection 
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between that capacity and the virtue of justice. But in this new definition, the emphasis is 
simply on the rule itself, with no indication that such rule is good for anyone apart from 
the ruler. But this means that, in his central definition of virtue, Meno has severed any 
apparent connection between between virtue and that element of service and devotion 
which had found at least some place in his previous definition of the virtue of a man. 
Perhaps, then, we must take this to suggest that, when push comes to shove, it is only his 
belief that virtue must be good for us which is of any true importance to Meno - and not 
the more obviously selfless and nobler dimensions of a virtue such as justice. - But 
perhaps to our surprise, in only a single brief exchange, Meno will completely reverse the 
change that he has just made to his original definition of virtue. For, Socrates will ask 
Meno whether virtue is being able to rule, or whether it isn't rather being able to rule 
justly, rather than unjustly (73d6-8)? But Meno, for his part, will agree so strongly that 
only a just ruler could ever be virtuous, that he will now assert that justice is virtue 
(73d9)! Thus, with only the slightest prodding, Socrates not only leads Meno to weave 
justice back into his definition of virtue, but he even leads him toward the opposite 
extreme, and toward the view that being just simply is being virtuous. And this gives us 
our first true indication of just how little awareness Meno actually has of precisely what 
he is saying, or of the radical differences between the different conceptions or ideas 
which he is inclined to simply identify with virtue itself.  
 
But, Socrates will immediately proceed to refute this new definition of virtue, and to 
show Meno that he does not believe so simply that virtue is justice. For first, Socrates 
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will ask Meno whether justice is virtue, or whether it is a certain virtue (73e1)? But, after 
Socrates clarifies this question with the relation between 'roundness' and 'shape,' by 
suggesting that roundness is a certain shape, and not shape simply (73e2-6), Meno will at 
once grasp the meaning of the question, and agree that justice is not the same as virtue, 
since there are other virtues as well. For courage, in his opinion, at least, is a virtue, as is 
moderation and magnificence and wisdom and very many others (73e7-74a5). But then, 
Socrates points out, they have once again suffered the same thing: for though they are 
seeking for one virtue, they have again stumbled upon many (74a6-9). 
 
But, in considering this Socratic refutation, let me note once again that it is Meno who 
claims that there are a multiplicity of virtues. For while Socrates certainly leads Meno's 
views out into the open with his analogy of 'roundness' and 'shape,' he himself still has 
yet to assert that there are a multiplicity of virtues; which means, in turn, that he has yet 
to assert that there is a single form of virtue, which unites a multiplicity of virtues in 
common. (Which might also explain why Socrates variously refers to the object of their 
inquiry as 'one virtue,' 'one form of virtue,' and a whole, of which each 'virtue' is a part; 
72a6-8, 72c6-72d1, and 79b1-79e3). Thus, Socrates has not proven that virtue cannot be 
a virtue. Rather, he has only shown Meno - and those who agree with him - that we 
cannot possibly hold the opinion that justice is virtue, while also holding the opinion that 
there are virtues which are other than justice. Hence, it remains entirely possible that 
Socrates, at any rate, identifies virtue with a single virtue - prudence, for example (89a4-
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5). Thus, Socrates' refutation here, by itself, does not yet tell us anything about Socrates' 
own opinions.  
 
But, let me just conclude my commentary on this section by trying to articulate a little 
more clearly what is important about what Socrates' examination has revealed. For to 
begin with, I believe that many of us might be tempted to agree that virtue simply is 
justice. For, what could each of us mean by "an excellent person," after all, if we do not 
mean someone who surpasses others in the purity and the skill with which they devote 
themselves to the common good, and with which they serve something higher and greater 
than themselves? And yet, I believe that we are likely to agree with Meno that there are 
other kinds of people who we believe to be excellent, or to act in a manner that is both 
beautiful and choiceworthy. For it does seem that, even without serving the common 
good, one can display the excellence of courage (in a courageous and brave fight against 
cancer, for instance); or display the excellence of moderation (in bringing one's soul into 
a harmonious and beautiful order, for instance, such that one's higher desires always 
triumph over those desires which are lower and less fundamental); or, finally, display the 
excellence of wisdom (by eagerly striving to grasp the mysterious and elusive character 
of the whole, and to come to know what each of the beings are). Hence, I would suggest 
that each of us is likely to agree with Meno that justice is not the only kind of excellence 
that we recognize. But in that case, we would only be left, once again, with the question 
of what unites all of these different kinds of excellence - or what virtue is. Hence, it 
 18 
remains to be seen, in what will follow, what Meno and Socrates' conversation can 






















IV. An Interlude on Shape and Color (74b3 - 77a5) 
 
We have seen, then, that Meno's second attempt to say what virtue is was no more 
successful than his first. But, nevertheless, Socrates will strive to push the conversation 
forward, by now offering a long and puzzling digression on the essence of shape and 
color (74b3 - 77a5). Accordingly, in what follows, the question of "what is virtue" will 
almost fade from sight entirely; and what will come into the foreground, instead, is the 
epistemological and methodological character of Socratic philosophy - or, stated more 
plainly, the way that Socrates sought to know each of the beings. Now, as I suggested 
before, if virtue is truly a kind of knowledge (89a4-5), then this section may begin to 
answer Meno's original question of how virtue comes to be present (70a1-5). For this 
section will certainly contain many important observations about how learning takes 
place, and about the different approaches toward knowledge of each of the beings. But, 
however that might be, it is certainly with a view toward these intensely theoretical and 
epistemological questions that the entire contents of the following section will be 
directed. 
 
Now, Socrates begins this section by making the claim that, just as roundness is different 
from shape, on account of the fact that there are other shapes as well, so is white different 
from color, on account of the fact that there are other colors; or, since Socrates speaks 
here of this being the case with "everything" (74b4-5), that any species is different from 
its genus on account of the fact that its genus has other species as well (74b4 - 74d2). But, 
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I believe that we are likely to notice upon reflection just how strange this Socratic 
argument truly is. For, why would the fact that there are other species of a genus be the 
reason that a species is different from its genus? For after all, isn't any species necessarily 
different from its genus? But in that case, why would the apparently incidental fact that 
there are other species as well provide any reason or support for that difference? 
 
In my judgment, this question is bound to only appear more difficult to answer the longer 
we attempt to meditate upon its solution. But, I would also suggest that that is the very 
reason that Socrates has included this strange argument here, and repeated it throughout 
the dialogue (74b4-d2; 73e3-6). For I believe that this strange argument is actually 
designed to lead us on a search for its concealed and hidden premises; and that these 
premises, once uncovered, provide a kind of window into the hidden complexity and 
richness of Socrates' understanding of the human mind - and into an understanding which 
helps to illuminate the precise mental faculties or powers that come into play in our 
attempts to say what a thing is.  
 
For, to begin with, there are only two possible ways to say what a given thing is. The first 
is to simply say that that thing is y, where y denotes a single whole idea which is identical 
in meaning to the word that we are defining. And this is like when we answer the 
question of "what is the beneficial" by saying that the "beneficial" is the "advantageous." 
This way of answering a "what is" question, then, can sometimes lead to quite important 
results, whenever one word happens to be considerably clearer or more distinct than 
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another, and whenever we can discover what the meaning of the less clear word is by 
having recourse to the meaning which is clearer and more distinct. But, the second and 
the more common way of saying what a thing is consists of first articulating the genus of 
the thing to be defined, and then articulating the whole set of characteristics which 
distinguish it from the other members of its genus. For instance, what is a "triangle"? A 
triangle is a rectilinear three-sided figure. Hence: a "triangle" (the thing to be defined) is a 
"figure" (its genus) which "rectilinear" and "three-sided" (its specific differentia.) Thus, 
in recognizing that "a rectilinear three sided-figure" is what a triangle is, our minds 
cognize that the whole idea of "triangle" is wholly constituted by the noetic parts of 
"figure," "rectilinear," and "three-sided." Now, in explaining how the mind is able to 
discover these noetic parts in the first place, it is tempting to think that are able to "break" 
the object of our inquiry into its distinct parts. For instance, we might think that, after we 
have first grasped the idea of "triangle" as a whole, we begin by snapping off that part of 
the whole which forms its genus ("figure"), and then snap off each of its specific 
differentia, in order that we might discover the character of its each of its parts. But, this 
would of course imply that the mind has a power of analysis, or an ability to break an 
idea into its discrete parts.  
 
Now, if we truly did have such a power, then it would of course be possible to say that 
"white" is different from "color," even if there were no other colors at all. For just as we 
could break the idea of "triangle" into  "figure," "three-sided," and "rectilinear," we could 
also break the idea of "white" into "color" and "whiteness." Thus, the idea of "white" 
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alone, along with our power of analysis, would suffice to recognize that "white" is 
something different from "color;" which would mean, in turn, that our judgment that 
white is other than color would not be made on account of the fact that there are other 
species of color. But I believe that this suggests that part of what Socrates' argument must 
be implying is that the human mind actually has no such power of "analysis" at all. For I 
believe that it is Socrates' view that, if all we ever had was the idea of "white," our minds 
could never "break apart" that idea, in order to arrive at an idea of "color." Rather, it is 
only because we have already reached the idea of color in a different way - and not 
through any such "analysis" of "white" - that it is ever possible for us to say that white is 
different from color, or that white is a kind of color. But, by suggesting that we can only 
say that white is different from color on account of the fact that there are other colors as 
well, doesn't Socrates suggest precisely how it is that we attain the idea of color in the 
first place? For what I think that Socrates is suggesting is that, if we only ever perceived 
things that were white, then it would be impossible for us to ever form an idea of "color;" 
and, hence, it would be impossible to judge that "white" and "color" are distinct. For to 
form an idea, the mind must first gather together a group of perceived or imagined 
beings, and then abstract whatever form or whatever set of characteristics were common 
to each of the beings in question. But that means that, if the only color that we perceived 
was white, we could never form an idea of color at all. For by gathering together a group 
of white beings, our minds could only abstract the characteristics or the form that is 
common to them all ("white") - but not the narrower set of characteristics which they also 
happen to share in common ("color"). Hence, it is only by first abstracting a number of 
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different kinds of color ("white," "green," "blue," etc), and then by abstracting what is 
common between them all, that our minds are ever able to reach the idea of "color" at all 
- or even to be able to say that white, and green, and blue, are kinds of colors. (For 
without this, they may share the characteristics of color in common, but they are not yet 
recognized as particular members of the form of color - which means, in turn, that each of 
them is not yet a kind of color. And this may indicate what Socrates means by suggesting 
that it is the single form which causes each particular to be the kind of thing that it is. 
72c7-8).  
 
Hence, from all of the above, Socrates' strange argument would finally follow as a 
necessary consequence: it would only be the fact that there are other species of a genus 
that lets us say that a particular species is different from its genus. For, without those 
other species, we could never form the idea of the genus, and could therefore never say 
that the species and the genus were distinct. Now of course, there is no doubt that the 
argument which I have just given is quite elaborate, and not obviously suggested by the 
text. But, in my judgment, and for the reasons that I have given, I believe that this is the 
rich and complicated view of the mind that must lay buried beneath Socrates' strange and 
quiet argument. Accordingly, I would suggest that, by pointing us toward the mind's 
dependence on unity and multiplicity in order to distinguish a genus from its species, 
Socrates points towards how the apparently simple act of saying "what a thing is" - a 
"triangle," for instance - is ultimately accomplished.  
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But, after these complicated matters, Socrates will next just repeat a basic and a 
fundamental point which he had made before - that, to say what something is, one must 
say what unites all of the members of that particular class or kind (74d3-74e1). Yet, he 
will also emphasize here that the articulation of what something is must include even 
those members which are "contraries" of one another, in the way that the round is the 
contrary of the straight. Now, this new emphasis on the "contrary" species of a genus 
may make us wonder if virtue, too, may possess contrary species. - But, perhaps that 
question has already been answered in what we have seen before. For by appealing to two 
different kinds of principles in order to determine what actions are "appropriate" (71e1-
7), hasn't Meno already pointed toward two very different "species" of virtue? Perhaps, 
then, just such contraries as these are what divide the many virtues, the one from the 
other. And in that case, we would again be reminded of the difficulty of trying to say 
what precisely it is that each of them truly shares in common.  
 
But while one might well expect Socrates to follow up on his most recent discussion of 
shape and color by now applying that discussion directly to virtue, we are instead 
surprised to find that Socrates will actually proceed to drop the question of virtue 
entirely. For after having previously used the question of "what is shape" as a paradigm 
for how to answer the question of virtue, Socrates will now simply ask Meno to say what 
shape is, as if that was the question that he was interested in pursuing (74e10-75a1). And 
when Meno gives no answer to this question, Socrates simply goads him once again, now 
claiming that Meno ought to try to say what shape is, in order that he may thereby attain 
 25 
practice with a view toward answering about virtue (75a1-11). But Meno, for his part, 
refuses to comply, and demands that Socrates say what shape is instead (75b1). - This 
brief interlude, by the way, may provide an especially clear response to Meno's opening 
question of how virtue comes to be present. For Socrates here suggests that, in order to be 
able to learn what virtue is, a significant amount of practice is necessarily required. And 
this implies that even if virtue is learnable, learning what it is might ultimately require 
that we first engage in an extremely rigorous kind of practice. Finally, this may also 
suggest one of the many ways that "theoretical" and "practical" philosophy are linked 
together. For Socrates suggests that Meno may be unable to answer the questions of 
practical philosophy, without first practicing on the problems of theoretical philosophy. 
 
But Meno, for his part, flatly refuses to engage in a practice of this kind (75b1-8). And as 
we shall see in what follows, this refusal will bring about a radical change in the entire 
character of the conversation. For in the next part of the dialogue (75b9-77a5), the 
discussion of virtue will fade even further into the background, as Socrates will proceed 
to make three successive attempts to say what shape and color are - two of shape (75b9-
76a7), and one of color (76a8-77a5). Now of course, we may wonder precisely what is at 
stake in the seemingly minor question of how shape and color are to be defined. But, I 
would suggest that the deepest intention of these three definitions is to present and to 
contrast the way that three different human sciences each go about attempting to 
articulate the character of the visible world. For while the first definition will show us 
how Socratic philosophy says what shape is (75b9-c1), the second definition will show us 
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how shape is defined by geometry (75e1-76a7), while the third definition will show how 
color is defined by natural science (76a8-77a5). But, in this way, Socrates will provide us 
with an implicit critique of the sciences of natural science and mathematics. For Socrates' 
three definitions of shape and color, when placed side by side, will suggest both that 
philosophy exceeds geometry and natural science in its grasp of the world, while also 
suggesting the precise way that it does so. But, since geometry and natural science might 
even seem to be the most powerful scientific alternatives to philosophy, Socrates' 
procedure here might even seem to serve as an argument for philosophy's place as the 
science which best articulates the true character of each of the beings. Accordingly, I 
believe that this entire interlude will prove to cast considerable light on the way that 
Socrates sought to know what the beings are, and on how he believed that genuine 
knowledge of the world comes to be present.  
 
With that said as a preface, then, let us simply begin by considering the definition of 
shape that Socrates offers as his own. For according to Socrates, this is what shape is: that 
which alone of the beings always happens to accompany color (75b10-12). Now, in 
considering what we might learn from this definition, I believe that we are bound to be 
struck at once by its extraordinary simplicity and clarity. For almost every part of that 
definition is either an absolutely necessary part of any possible definition - "that which 
alone of the beings" and "always," for instance, both of which must be said or thought in 
order that a definition might 'point out' its subject among the many beings - or a word of 
the utmost clarity and self-evidence ("accompanies," "color"). Accordingly, we see at 
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once that, for Socrates, a true definition of what a thing is should stick as closely as 
possible to our true awareness of the world; and this simple point will be deeply 
expanded and elaborated on in what will follow. 
 
But, before moving on to the next two interpretations, let me just say a few things about 
what this definition is not. For I believe that the whole premise of this section (the 
superiority of Socrates' first definition to his later two) - along with his claim that he 
would be "content" if Meno defined virtue in the way that he defined shape (75b13-c1) - 
might lead us to believe that Socrates' definition of shape is presented as a kind of perfect 
model for the definitions of each of the other classes or kinds. However, in my judgment, 
this view would be mistaken. For according to Socrates' definition here, shape is that 
which, alone of the beings, always happens to accompany color (75b10-12). But this 
means that there is no necessary connection between what shape is, and its happening to 
be the sole kind of being which is always co-present with color. For our same idea of 
shape might well be present in a different sort of being, for whom it is not true that shape 
alone always accompanies color; a being with a sixth or a seventh sense, for example. 
Hence, Socrates' account does not articulate what shape always is (or what character or 
characteristics all shapes must necessarily share in common in order to be shapes), but 
what shapes always happen to be (in our experience so far). But accordingly, I would 
suggest that this statement is inferior to any definition which actually articulates a thing's 
true essence or character. For to return to my earlier example, a triangle does not 
"happen" to be a three-sided figure. Rather, if a triangle exists, then it must be three-sided 
 28 
- or else, it could not be a triangle at all. Thus, such a definition succeeds at at saying 
what a thing actually is; which means, in turn, that it is not contingent upon our 
experience. For since any triangle that appears must be three-sided, in order to be a 
triangle, it follows that no possible future experience could reveal that a triangle is not 
three-sided. Hence, unlike Socrates' definition of shape, saying that a triangle is a three-
sided figure speaks directly to what is truly necessary and impossible, or to the 
intelligible limits of all coming-into-being - for it is as knowably necessary that a future 
triangle must be three-sided, as it is knowably impossible that a future triangle ever be 
four-sided. Thus, in my judgment, by speaking directly to what is necessary and 
impossible, such a definition is simply better than the kind of definition which Socrates 
had offered here for shape.  
 
Of course, if my argument is correct, then we might wonder why Socrates chooses to 
provide the particular definition of shape that he does. But, I would suggest that it is 
simply because no better definition of shape, at least, is possible. For given the almost 
elemental character of shape, there may simply not be another word which expresses the 
same idea more clearly, nor any way to articulate what shape is in terms of its genus and 
its differentia. Hence, for shape, at least, this would be the best definition that is possible; 
but it would not simply be a perfect paradigm for the definition of all of the other classes 
or kinds. (Finally, I would also add that Socrates' suggestion that he would be "content" 
with a similar definition of virtue only suggests that he would be willing to settle for an 
articulation which "points out" the single form of virtue, without yet saying what must 
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necessarily be shared in common by each of the virtues. But this, I think, may be a 
continuation of Socrates' more limited attempts to simply establish that there is a single 
form of virtue, without yet attempting to say what that form itself is - see 73a1-c8, fr 
example.)  
 
Now after providing Meno with this first definition of shape, Meno's protests will lead 
Socrates to offer another definition of shape entirely (75c2-d7; 75e1-76a7). However, this 
definition, unlike Socrates' preceding account, will begin from what Meno agrees that he 
knows; or, as Socrates suggests in the context, it will prove to be more "dialectical" in 
character (75d2-7). For Socrates will begin by securing Meno's agreement that he knows 
what an "end" is, or a limit or extremity; and that, likewise, he calls one thing a plane, 
and another thing a solid, just as in the manner of geometry (75e1-76a2). But with these 
agreements established, Socrates then goes on to provide a new definition of shape: for 
shape, Socrates now says, is the limit of a solid (76a3-7).  
 
But, I believe that the limitations of this new approach are clear at once. For from the fact 
that an interlocutor agrees that he knows a thing, it hardly follows that he does know the 
thing in question. For as Socrates slyly jokes, perhaps "Prodicus" - a Sophist famed for 
his precision of speech - would object to identifying an end with a limit or an extremity; 
but "you," Meno, surely call some (one) thing both limited and ended (75e1-5). Hence, 
by beginning from a term that is not clearly or distinctly known, Socrates' second 
definition simply fails to attain the clarity of his first. For while Socrates' first definition 
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had begun from what we are actually aware of, and what we are aware of with the 
greatest clarity and self-evidence that is possible, his second had begun merely from what 
we think that we are aware of, and aware of with sufficient clarity and distinctness. But, 
as I believe that Socrates' mathematical language here suggests, this second definition is 
also meant as a kind of critique of geometry, or of the way that geometry seeks to know 
each of the beings. For while mathematics takes great care in making sure that each of its 
conclusions follows from their premises, it rarely takes a corresponding care in securing 
the clarity or precision of those premises themselves - as is evident even in a 
mathematical work as great as Euclid's Elements. For mathematics is not concerned with 
saying precisely what a "point" is, or what a "line" is, or what planes and solids actually 
are; for the character of these things are simply set down as hypotheses, from which the 
conclusions or the theorems of mathematics are ultimately derived. But this means, in 
turn, that while geometry succeeds wonderfully at bringing the hidden relations of shape 
to light, it hardly succeeds at clarifying what those shapes actually are, or at clarifying or 
elucidating the basic awareness of shape that constitutes the unexamined presupposition 
of the science of geometry as a whole. And this point, I would suggest, essentially 
mirrors Socrates' comparison of geometry and philosophy in the Republic. For as 
Socrates argues there, while geometry does somehow lay hold of what is, it is only able 
to "dream" of the beings; for, by setting down "hypotheses," without being able to give a 
full account of them, geometry lacks the capacity to see its objects in full awakeness 
(Republic, 533b5-c2)4. But this, of course, is contrasted with philosophy (or, "dialectics;" 
                                                 
4 Plato, The Republic, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991). All 
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Republic, 533c7-9); for philosophy is a continual process of destroying the "hypotheses," 
in order to ascend toward the true beginning point of knowledge - or, is a continual 
process of destroying our somehow flawed or confused articulations of the world, or of 
destroying the world that we think that we know, in order to ascend upwards toward the 
world of which we are truly aware - and aware of with the kind of basic evidence and 
clarity of "shape" and "color." 
 
Of course, in the context of the Meno, these considerations may lead us to wonder 
whether virtue itself is something that we think that we are aware of, or something that 
we are aware of in truth. But, I would suggest that just this distinction is what 
distinguishes the virtue(s) that Socrates is ignorant of, from the one that he does 
understand (86b8-86c2 with 87c11-89a5 as a whole). For while the former are what we 
merely "think" that we are aware of, the latter is that true virtue that we are aware of, and 
that each of us somehow always divines.  
 
After presenting this examination of geometry, then, Socrates will next offer Meno a 
definition of color, and one that also begins from what Meno thinks that he knows about 
the world. For, first, Socrates will confirm that Meno has adopted Empedocles' theory 
that there are certain "effluences" of the beings; or, that each body continually emanates 
certain "effluences," which are invisible to our sight (76c8-10). Next, Meno will also 
agree that bodies have certain "pores," of varying shapes and sizes, into which and 
                                                                                                                                                 
quotations or paraphrases of the Republic will be from this edition. 
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through which these effluences proceed (76c11-76d2). Finally, Socrates will secure 
Meno's agreement that there is such a thing as "sight" (76d3-4). And, on the basis of these 
things, Socrates will now define what color is: for color, Socrates says, is an emanation of 
shapes commensurate with sight, and hence subject to perception (76d5-7). 
 
But if the previous definition had been deficient merely by its obscurity or lack of 
distinctness, while otherwise serving to somehow articulate what we mean by shape, I 
believe that this definition fails entirely to tell us anything about what color is. For, 
Socrates' account here says identifies color with its material constituents or causes. Yet, 
even if these material elements are the cause of color's being present, they are not color 
themselves. For we or another being might certainly be aware of color, even if these 
"effluences" or "pores" did not exist at all; which means, in turn, that these material 
elements have no relation of identity to the colors that we perceive - even if they might 
stand as cause to color as an effect.  But then, by putting forward the false identification 
in question, and showing us that this identification is in accord with Meno's customary 
ways of thought, Socrates helps to reveal an error that is endemic to natural science as 
such, and which accompanies natural science in all times and places. For of course, even 
in our own day, we are likely to hear scientists claim that the objects of our awareness are 
their material causes - that color, for instance, just is a photon or a wave of light, or that 
desire just is dopamine, or that each of our thoughts and our ideas are just certain 
arrangements of neurons. But, all of these statements make the mistake of identifying the 
cause of a phenomenon with that phenomenon itself; or, of identifying the explanation 
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with the thing to be explained. For somehow, natural science wants to say that all things 
are composed of certain basic and unchanging material elements - that all things are 
composed of atoms, for instance, or of quarks or strings. But, I believe that this view is 
necessarily mistaken. For while the bodies in the external world may be composed of 
atoms or of quarks, the sounds that we hear are composed of other sounds, and the shaped 
colors that we perceive are composed of other shapes and colors; just as our thoughts are 
composed of other thoughts, for instance, and our sensations are each composed of other 
sensations. For, that which might be the ultimate material for bodies that are external to 
the soul cannot be the ultimate material for the objects of our awareness; for the external 
and material bodies are one thing, but the objects of our awareness are another. 
Accordingly, even if one is tempted to grant the most extreme hypothesis of natural 
science - that all things only come-into-being as the result of certain material causes - it 
still would not be the case that the objects within our soul are those causes themselves, or 
are composed of matter. Hence, as Socrates illuminates here, it is simply impossible for 
the kinds of explanations provided by natural science to ever give an adequate account of 
what the visible world actually is - however it might succeed, of course, at explaining 
how that world comes to be present. - Which might also suggest just how different the 
questions of how virtue comes to be present and what virtue is might truly be. 
 
Thus, through these two critiques together, Socrates quietly suggests how a different kind 
of science might make its approach towards the character of each of the beings. For, 
unlike mathematics, philosophy does not "set down" any first premises or principles, but 
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rather uses our opinions and convictions about the world as "hypotheses," in order to 
ascend from them toward the truly self-sufficient and natural starting point of all 
knowledge of the world. Likewise, unlike natural science, philosophy does not attempt to 
reduce the visible world to its allegedly material and efficient causes.  For while our 
world may be caused by certain material elements, it is surely not the same as those 
elements themselves. Thus, the task of identifying and clarifying the objects of that world 
must be approached through a different methodology entirely - different from that of 
mathematics, or the one hand, or that of natural science, on the other. But, by his earlier 
attempts to draw our gaze toward what it means to provide an adequate definition of the 
forms or the classes that constitute our world, while also providing a quiet pointer toward 
the mind's ultimate dependence upon the visible particulars, and its complicated 
processes of gathering and abstraction, Socrates has shown us something of how 
philosophy can truly come to know the character of the beings, or how it can ascend 
upwards towards a true grasp of our most basic and fundamental awareness of the world. 
Hence, with these final lessons and teachings about the place of philosophy within the 








V. Meno's Final Definition of Virtue (77a6 - 79e5) 
 
But after this complex and theoretical interlude, Socrates will once again return to the 
fundamental question of the Meno. For he will again ask Meno to say what form unites 
all of the many virtues in common (77a6-77b1). And Meno, for his part, proves able to 
offer one last definition of virtue - and a definition which, in my judgment, is his clearest 
and most important articulation of virtue so far. For Meno will now say that this, in fact, 
is what virtue is: "the desire for noble things, and the capacity to provide them for 
oneself" (77b1-4).  
 
Now, before I begin to try to explain the character of this definition, I believe that it 
would be good to first say a few words here about what is actually meant by the Greek 
word for "noble." For while guiding us toward the true definition of nobility is an 
essential task of the Platonic dialogues, such that our understanding of what "the noble" 
is must somehow be an end, and not a beginning, of our studies, it is also true that we can 
only seek to know the character of nobility if we have some prior awareness of what that 
word denotes; and, since the Greek word for "noble" has no precise equivalent within our 
language, it seems to me that we run the danger of lacking even that preliminary 
understanding which is necessary in order to recollect or to become fully aware of the 
character of nobility. As such, let me first attempt to simply provide a foundation for our 
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understanding, and one which goes beyond what Plato himself would have needed to 
provide for his Greek contemporaries. 
 
To begin with, the Platonic dialogues suggest that an ordinary Greek interlocutor would 
have believed that each of the virtues is noble, or that the noble is somehow the broader 
genus or class of which virtues such as justice and courage would have been distinct 
members. Hence, in trying to grasp what Meno would have meant by "nobility," we 
might very well begin by thinking that this word is significantly akin to our own word of 
"morality." For just as a Greek would say that each of the virtues is noble, so too do we 
say that courageous actions, and moderate actions, and just actions, are all moral. 
Likewise, if we were asked what goal is pursued in common by the courageous man, the 
moderate man, and the just man, "living a moral life" would seem to be an adequate 
answer, just as "living a noble life" would seem adequate to a Greek. Hence, it would 
seem that there is a strong kinship between noble things and moral things, and that the 
Greek word for "the noble" functions much as "morality" does within our own language.  
 
Now, I would add that there are also certain subtleties to nobility that should be pointed 
out. For while "the moral" seems to be especially or even exclusively concerned with 
preserving and promoting the good of other human beings, it is not simply obvious that 
"the noble" has this precise limitation. For someone who devotes their life to serving God 
and doing what is pious might well seem to be acting extraordinarily nobly, for instance, 
even if it is not obvious without further argument that their actions are correctly described 
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as "moral." Likewise, the word that I am translating as "noble" need not always be 
translated or meant in that way. For that word can just as easily be translated as 
"beautiful," in the sense that we say that a piece of music, or a painting, is beautiful to 
behold. And this means that, when the idea of the noble/beautiful is applied to a moral 
action, it always has a special emphasis on the beauty of that action - on the fact, for 
instance, that it is beautiful to see a brave man give his life for his country on the 
battlefield. But this means that, when an action that we would describe as "moral" is 
described by a Greek as "noble/beautiful," it draws attention especially to the 
attractiveness and allure of that action; which means, in turn, that it draws attention to the 
apparent harmony between the noble and the good, or between what is beautiful in itself 
and what is good for us, in a way that describing an action as "moral" does not do quite 
so obviously. 
 
Thus, to just offer a tentative definition of nobility (which, I would insist once again, can 
only be a stepping stone toward reaching a truly adequate understanding of what nobility 
actually is), I would suggest that a person acts nobly when they sacrifice their merely 
private interest in order to devote themselves to something that is higher than themselves. 
And while we may lack any single word that precisely captures this phenomenon of "the 
noble,"  I believe that this does nothing to change the fact that it remains an incredibly 
important object of human action and desire. Thus, in order to better understand 
ourselves, and to understand what it is that we genuinely yearn for, it may be of 
considerable help to understand what the noble is. But as I suggested before, it seems to 
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me that guiding us toward this understanding is one of the essential tasks of the Platonic 
dialogues; and, one of the essential tasks of the following passage of the Meno, in 
particular.  
 
With that said, let me now return to the point from which I began. In what we have just 
seen, Meno had defined the virtuous man as someone who desires the noble things, while 
being able to provide them for himself. Now, after hearing this definition, Socrates will 
ask Meno whether those who desire the noble things are also desirers of what is good 
(77b6-7). For I believe that Socrates is suggesting that it is an essential part of what we 
mean by nobility that it is something good for us; and even, perhaps, that it is our 
supreme and perfect good, or that acting nobly constitutes the path toward our truest and 
deepest happiness. But, however that might be, Meno will at once agree that those who 
desire the noble things are necessarily desirers of what is good (77b8). But, after 
confirming that Meno holds the view in question, Socrates will next ask whether Meno 
has given his original definition on the grounds that there are some who desire what is 
good, and others who desire what is bad? And he will suggest, additionally, that it is his 
own opinion that all people desire what is good (77b9-77c2). 
 
Now, it is difficult to see how the question that Socrates has raised bears any relation to 
Meno's most recent definition of virtue, or in any way constitutes its "ground." For of 
course, Meno has said that the virtuous are distinguished by their love of a certain kind of 
good (namely, that kind of good which is "noble"), but he does not seem to have said 
 39 
anything more generally about what human beings desire. But while Socrates' question 
might seem to bear little relation to the view that he is ostensibly examining, Meno will 
nevertheless agree that he does believe that there are some people who desire the bad 
things (77b9-77c5). Thus, Meno's response will now set the stage for Socrates to examine 
this new opinion; without yet, of course, indicating what relation this examination will 
ultimately have to his broader examination of Meno's third articulation of virtue.  
 
That examination will proceed as follows. First, Socrates will ask if Meno means that 
some people desire the bad things because they believe that they are good, or if he means 
that  some people desire the bad things while knowing that they are bad (77c6-7)? But 
Meno, for his part, says that both kinds of men exist: for some people desire the bad 
things while believing that they are good, but others desire the bad things while knowing 
that they are bad (77c6-11).  
 
Next, Socrates will ask whether those who desire the bad things while knowing that they 
are bad also believe that they are beneficial, or know that they are harmful (77c12-77d3)? 
Again, Meno will say that both kinds of men exist: for (1) some men desire things which 
they know are bad, and believe to be beneficial; while (2) other men desire things which 
they know are bad, and know to be harmful (77d1-5). Next, Socrates will try to show that 
the first group of men - (1) - cannot exist. For he correctly argues that it is impossible to 
know that something which is bad is also beneficial (or good), since being harmful is part 
of what it means to be bad (77d6-8). Hence, it follows that no one who knows that the 
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bad things are bad can also believe or know that they are beneficial. Accordingly, it 
cannot be these men who desire the bad things (77d9-e5). Next, Socrates will try to prove 
that the second group of men - (2) - also cannot exist. For of course, the bad makes us 
wretched, while the wretched are unhappy (77e6-78a5). However, there is no one who 
wants to be wretched and unhappy - for, implicitly, all of us deeply wish and yearn to be 
happy  (78a6-8). Hence, no human being can ever desire a thing that they know is bad. 
Hence, a human being can only desire a thing that is bad if they happen to believe that it 
is good (78a9-78b2). 
 
Having thereby brought his attempted refutation of Meno's belief to to its conclusion, 
Socrates will now finally apply this lengthy refutation to the question of what virtue is. 
Yet, as we shall see in the sequel, that application will prove to rest upon a mere sleight-
of-hand - for Socrates will slyly substitute an entirely new definition of virtue for Meno's 
own, and will only apply his examination to that newly substituted definition. For first, 
Socrates will simply "confirm" that Meno had said before that virtue is to desire the good 
things, while being capable of providing them for himself (78b3-5)? But Meno, not 
noticing the substitution, will agree that this is what he said. But next, Socrates shows 
that this definition can simply be reduced to the claim that virtue is the capacity to 
provide the good things for oneself. For since Socrates has shown that no one differs 
from another in respect to their desire for the good, it follows that "the wanting is 
common to all," or that "desiring the good things" does not form any part of what 
distinguishes an excellent man from a base man. Hence, Socrates concludes, Meno's 
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definition of virtue amounts just to this: virtue is the ability to provide the good things for 
oneself (78b6-78c1).  
 
But, while Meno's lack of awareness of the difference between the noble and the good 
leads him to accept this revision without objection (78c2-3), we, for our part, should take 
note of the magnitude of the alteration. For of course, while we each recognize that the 
noble is something good, we also recognize that the love of the noble is not simply 
reducible to the love of the good. For we all somehow sense that part of what it means to 
act nobly is to act in a way that goes beyond our mere self-interest, or  that aims toward 
something higher or greater than ourselves - something which is truly noble (whatever, 
precisely, that noble thing might be). And this means that, even if anything that is noble 
must necessarily be good, it would not yet follow that someone who loves the noble loves 
it because it is good; for one who merely loves the good could not love the noble in its 
full richness or complexity. Thus, by applying his examination of our desires to a 
definition of virtue which is entirely of his own invention, Socrates of course fails to 
actually provide any obvious or explicit refutation of Meno whatsoever. And we might 
perhaps conclude from this that Socrates is actually unable to refute Meno's third and 
final definition of virtue; although, if that is the case, it is hard to see why Socrates would 
not admit the correctness of this definition. But, perhaps we might conclude that Socrates 
has again only attempted to refute Meno's views, or to show that Meno cannot 
consistently hold this definition, without even trying to show that there is anything which 
is actually wrong with this definition itself.  
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But however these things might be, Socrates will continue his examination by next asking 
whether Meno calls such things as health and money "good" (78c8-9). For his part, Meno 
agrees at once that he does call these things good; and he voluntarily adds that he also 
calls honor in cities and offices good, as well (78c10-11). Next, Socrates asks whether 
Meno recognizes any goods others than these; but, perhaps to our surprise, Meno claims 
that he does not - these are the only sorts of good thing (78c12-14). Now, this stunning 
reversal might well remind us of Meno's earlier reduction of the virtue of a man into the 
mere capacity to rule the city. But, just as in that previous reversal, Socrates will again 
succeed at quickly causing Meno to re-incorporate justice back into his account of virtue. 
For with hardly any resistance whatsoever, Meno will at once agree that providing 
oneself with the good things is only virtuous when it is done justly, and that it is always 
viceful when it is done unjustly (78d3-79a1). And on this basis, Socrates concludes that 
virtue cannot be providing oneself with the good things: for the very lack of provision 
comes to be virtue, whenever it happens to be done justly (78e4-7).  
 
It would seem, then, that we have returned to the same perplexity that was present even 
back in Meno's first attempt to say what virtue is. Yet, by turning toward the fundamental 
question of what each of us desire, I believe that Socrates has at least begun to reveal 
some of the deepest psychic roots of Meno's own perplexity or confusion. For as we have 
seen, Meno is almost entirely unaware of the distinction between the noble and the good. 
Accordingly, he is almost entirely unaware of the way that his varying opinions about 
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these matters lead him to propose radically different accounts of the true character of 
virtue. But, it is in precisely this state of confusion that the dialogue will leave him; for 
after this point, there will be no further serious examination of what Meno believes that 
virtue is, or of his views about the noble and the good. However, if the examination of 
Meno's views has reached its conclusion here (and its clear high point in the examination 
of Meno's third and final definition), that hardly means that the work of the dialogue is at 
an end. For it remains to be seen, of course, what Socrates himself might actually believe 
that virtue is; and how else the virtue which he recognizes as virtue might come to be 
present. Accordingly, it will be with a view toward these two matters, especially, that the 














VI. Meno's Paradox And The Theory of Recollection (79e5 - 86c3) 
 
Now after having disposed of Meno's third and final attempt to say what virtue is, 
Socrates will try, once again, to get Meno to provide a truly adequate account of virtue 
(79e5-6). But Meno, for his part, seems to have finally had enough. For now, in a long, 
playful rebuke, which will darkly gesture toward Socrates' eventual fate (80b4-7), Meno 
suggests that Socrates is like a stingray, who numbs his interlocutors in both their tongue 
and their soul. For before, Meno suggests, he knew what virtue is; but now that he has 
been numbed, he is not able to say what it is at all (79e7-80b7).  
 
Of course, this rebuke suggests that Meno only believes that he has temporarily lost the 
ability to say what virtue is; but he does not take this perplexity to be a sign of any 
underlying ignorance of the character of virtue. Rather than making any further attempts 
here to persuade Meno that he is ignorant of virtue, however, or to show him that his 
definitions fail to correspond to what virtue is, Socrates instead merely attempts to 
distance himself a little from his likeness to a stingray. For if the stingray is numb and 
perplexed itself, Socrates says, then perhaps he is like the stingray; for it is above all else 
because he himself is numb and perplexed, that he makes others perplexed as well (80c7-
10). Even now, he continues, he does not know what virtue is; but perhaps Meno, at any 
rate, did know what it is, but is now "like" one who does not know (80c7-80d2). 
Nonetheless, Socrates concludes, he is willing to to join with Meno now in searching for 
whatever in the world virtue is (80d2-5). 
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But Meno not only refuses Socrates' present offer, but he also tries to prove that Socrates' 
proposed investigation of virtue would necessarily be a futile and impossible endeavor. 
For Meno argues that, if Socrates truly doesn't know what virtue is, then it must be 
impossible for him to seek to discover it. For, how could anyone ever set out to search for 
something, if they don't even know what that thing is to begin with? And, even if 
Socrates was to happen right upon it, how could he possibly know that what he has 
stumbled upon is virtue? For since he doesn't know what virtue is, then even if he 
discovered it by chance, he could not know that the thing he had discovered was virtue. 
Hence, Meno suggests, if Socrates is truly as ignorant about virtue as he claims, then it is 
simply impossible for him to seek to discover it (80d5-8). 
 
Now Socrates will at once chide Meno for this argument, and suggest that his argument 
here is merely "eristic" (80e1-2). And yet, I believe that Meno's argument here is simply 
correct. For if Socrates truly does not know at all what virtue is – as he has suggested 
numerous times that he does not (71a5-7; 71b1-3; 80c10-d2) – then it would indeed be 
impossible for him to seek to discover it: for how could we ever seek for something if we 
do not even have a dim awareness of what that thing is? Further, Meno is correct that, 
even if Socrates happened upon it, he could not possibly know that he had happened upon 
virtue, unless he had some prior awareness that let him recognize what he had found. 
Hence, even if his motivations here might be 'eristic,' Meno is also surely beginning to 
realize the extent to which Socrates must have some knowledge of virtue. Accordingly, in 
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spite of Socrates' verbal chiding, I believe that Meno's argument here is entirely 
sufficient.  
 
But, rather than giving an adequate response to Meno's objection, Socrates will instead 
cleverly replace the argument which Meno has just advanced with an argument of his 
own creation. For Socrates will now suggest that the sort of thing that Meno "meant" to 
say is this: that it is impossible for a human being to seek out either what he knows or 
what he does not know. For, if he does not know something, then he will not be able to 
search for it. But, if he does know it, then there is no need for the search; for, since it is 
already known, there is no need to discover it. Hence, it is impossible for a human being 
to seek to discover anything that is known, or anything that is unknown. But, of course, 
every thing is either known or unknown. Hence, it is impossible for a human being to 
seek to discover anything at all (80e1-6). 
 
(Note that Socrates' argument here is only a "proof" that we cannot learn something by 
searching for it - not that learning is impossible simply. For it does not rule out the 
possibility of learning a thing without having sought for it before; as children, for 
instance, must first learn of shape and color, and pleasure and pain, and all else that 
simply begins to appear.)  
 
But Meno, for his part, does not seem to notice Socrates' substitution. Instead, he simply 
asks Socrates whether this argument is "nobly stated" (81a1-2). But Socrates, for his part, 
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denies that it is. For rather than embracing this "eristic" argument, he will instead spin out 
a "true and noble" account, which offers an elaborate and perhaps mythic support of 
learning and philosophy; and an account which proves to be one of the most complicated 
and interesting passages in the entirety of the Meno (81a3-81e2). Accordingly, in what 
follows, I will first just summarize that argument as a whole, and then attempt to analyze 
each of those parts of the speech which seem to be most important.  
 
To begin with. Socrates first explains to Meno that the human soul is immortal; that at 
one time it comes to an end, and at another it comes into being again; but that it never 
does perish. And on account of these things, the divine poets have said that we ought to 
live our lives as piously as possible. "For from whomsoever Persephone accepts 
atonement for the ancient grief... [there will] arise glorious kings... called among human 
beings holy heroes" (81a10-81c4). 
 
Now since the soul is immortal, and has come to be many times and has seen both the 
things here and those in Hades - in fact, all things - there is nothing it hasn't learned. As a 
result, it is no wonder that it is able to recollect what virtue is, along with each of the 
other things. For, nature as a whole being akin, and the soul having learned all things, 
nothing prevents someone, once he has recollected just one thing, from learning 
everything else. For searching and learning as a whole are recollection (81c5-81d5). This 
account, then, would make us active, and ready to search; while Meno's account, by 
contrast, would make us idle and lazy. Thus, trusting this account to be true, we ought to 
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be active in the search, and not to give up on learning what virtue is (81d5-81e2). 
 
Now, let me consider the different parts of this speech. 
 
To begin with, Socrates' account begins from the premise that the soul is immortal, and 
that it is in a process of continual coming-into-being and perishing. But, from this single 
premise, two very different practical conclusions are suggested. For while the divine 
poets who originate this account claim that we ought to live our lives as piously as 
possible, Socrates himself says that we ought to be active and ready to search for what 
virtue is. Hence, a different practical conclusion is suggested in each of the two halves of 
the speech. Likewise, each of these halves point toward a different view of the ultimate 
foundation for these two ways of action. For while the first half of the speech suggests 
that living piously rests upon a belief in the mysterious power of the Gods (for the poetic 
lines suggest Persephone's mysterious will is the cause of our atonement - 81b9-11), the 
second half of the speech rests upon the teaching that nature is somehow fundamentally 
akin, thereby allowing us to know the truth about each of the beings (81c9-81d1). Thus, I 
would suggest that Socrates is here quietly sketching out two very different ways that we 
might guide our lives. For each of us can either obediently strive to be as pious as 
possible, in accordance with the laws which have been revealed to us, or we can instead 
choose to guide our lives through reason, and attempt to learn for ourselves what virtue 
truly is. And while the first possibility ultimately points toward our faith in the guidance 
of mysterious divinities, the second possibility points toward our trust in the knowability 
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of the whole. Now, with that said, I believe that it is also difficult to say why Socrates is 
sketching out these two possibilities at this point in the dialogue. But, perhaps there is 
some reason that Socrates might want see just how exactly Meno will respond to the 
presentation of these two alternatives.  
 
But however that might be, we should also note that Socrates' rather mythical account 
actually contains a quiet and entirely this-worldly suggestion about the true foundation of 
all human learning - while also showing that there is a kind of learning which is not 
recollection. For Socrates here claims that the reason that the soul knows all things, is 
that it has seen all things (81c5-9). Now, this claim of course suggests that sense-
perception is somehow the foundation of all of our learning about the world (as I also 
suggested in my earlier account of "white" and "color"). But, it also shows that there is a 
kind of learning which is not recollection. For of course, in order for recollection to be 
possible at all, this prior learning - which is not itself recollection - must already have 
taken place. But then, if the human soul can learn what something is through first 
perceiving it, then what need do we actually have for recollection at all? For of course, it 
would seem that we could simply learn what each of the beings in this world are, at least, 
by simply perceiving them once again, and learning them now in just the way that we had 
once learned them before. Thus, Socrates' own account seems to point toward the 
possibility of a kind of learning that is not itself a form of recollection - and a kind of 
learning that is available to us within this life alone.  
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Let me add at once, though, that the possibility which Socrates here suggests is entirely 
compatible with what he actually says about the relation between learning and 
recollection. For while Meno mistakenly believes that Socrates has claimed that learning 
is recollection, Socrates never actually makes that claim in his original speech. Rather, he 
says that learning and seeking are recollection as a whole. And this suggests, then, that 
both may be together what neither is apart. Or, stated otherwise, it may only be when we 
have learned the very thing that we had previously been seeking for, that the experience 
as a whole constitutes an act of "recollection." 
 
But this more limited and more plausible claim about how learning and seeking are both 
recollection may also begin to suggest how this lengthy and complicated speech actually 
responds to the paradoxes which had immediately preceded it. For by suggesting that the 
act of learning the very thing that we were seeking is a kind of "recollection," Socrates 
suggests that the very thing that we somehow know well enough to seek for can 
nevertheless exist within our souls in a state of "forgetfulness;" but that, by seeking and 
discovering what it is, it is possible to come into a full and clear awareness of a thing that 
we had only dimly or "forgetfully" been aware of before. And hasn't the entire dialogue 
so far powerfully exhibited just such a psychic state of "forgetfulness"? For while Meno 
is somehow aware of what virtue is - for if he were not, he could hardly be able to speak 
about or to discuss it - his awareness is also obscure and indistinct; for as we have seen 
repeatedly, Meno can't help but blur the components of his understanding of virtue 
together, without even realizing that he is doing so, or without even seeing that these are 
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the components of what virtue is. Thus, it is precisely these contradictions and confusions 
which are the clearest sign that Meno apprehends the true character of virtue in a state of 
profound "forgetfulness." Hence, it is just the possibility that we might "know" 
something in such a confused and contradictory way that provides the resolution to 
Socrates' paradoxes. For while it is surely the case that we cannot search for something 
without somehow knowing what it is, it is precisely because that knowledge can exist in 
such a profound state of "forgetfulness," that there is a need to try to discover the very 
thing that that we already somehow know. Thus, while it is impossible to seek for 
something that we do not know at all, it is not impossible to seek to "recollect" what we 
already somehow know. For such an activity is a necessary part of satisfying our desire to 
truly know the world in which we live. 
 
But, perhaps this resolution has not yet shown that it is possible to learn what virtue is, in 
particular. For while Socrates has tried to establish that we can recollect what virtue is on 
the grounds that we can recollect anything that we have seen before, this conclusion does 
not follow from its premise: for Socrates has provided no argument that virtue is 
something that we learned from seeing. But, perhaps this is merely a kind of logic-
chopping; and, in any event, it certainly constitutes no objection to the possibility that we 
can recollect the truth about what virtue is. For, as an earlier exchange has already made 
clear, we are certainly able to recollect a thing that we have heard (71c9-d2). But, of 
course, what child was not told that some things are right, while other things are wrong? 
And was it not after all through just such experiences as these that each of us learned 
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what virtue is, and began to wish earnestly to to do what is right, and to avoid what is 
wrong? Thus, while Socrates' proof does not establish that virtue can be recollected, I 
would suggest that such an act of recollection is certainly possible for a human being. 
 
Now as I have already suggested, Meno will entirely miss the subtlety in Socrates' 
identification of learning and seeking as a whole with recollection, and will thereby miss 
the entire connection between this long and complicated speech, and the original 
paradoxes which had been proposed before; for, if learning is simply recollection, it is 
hard to see what connection this speech could have with those earlier paradoxes. But, 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Meno will prove to be entirely untroubled by the lack of 
connection between his understanding of this speech, and the problem that had been 
raised before. For Meno will eagerly ask Socrates whether he can show that learning  is 
recollection; and to this extent, at least, Meno confirms that his earlier argument was 
eristic, and rested on no real doubts about the possibility of learning (81e3-5). - I would 
note, also, that Meno displays no eagerness to be taught about the immortality of the soul, 
or that one ought to live as piously as possible. - But rather than correct Meno's 
misunderstanding of his actual assertion, Socrates will choose to oblige him, and will 
attempt to give a kind of proof for the claim that all learning is recollection. For Socrates 
will now converse with a slave boy about a theorem of geometry, while Meno watches, 
and assesses for himself whether the boy is being taught the truth of that theorem, or is 
recollecting it from within the depths of his immortal soul (81e6-86c3).  
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Now, since almost all of this demonstration is quite easy to follow (consisting mostly of 
clear and elegant chains of mathematical reasoning), let me depart at this point from 
commenting on much of what is being said, and instead simply pick out and focus on the 
few important points that seem to be to be scattered throughout this mathematical 
demonstration.  
 
To begin with, I believe that Socrates' argument that one needs to know that one is 
ignorant in order to be willing to seek for knowledge captures a point that is almost at the 
heart of the pedagogical method of the Platonic dialogues. For if someone lacks 
awareness that they are ignorant of something, then they cannot possibly seek to discover 
that same thing (a point which has already been elegantly stated in what preceded - 80e4-
5); which means, in turn, that the first step in enabling anyone to learn for themselves is 
to help them realize that the world is far more unknown, and far more mysterious, than 
our initial education might have led us to believe. - But, there is one difficulty here. For 
while Socrates seems to suggest that becoming perplexed leads us to become aware of 
our ignorance (84a8-b1), we have already seen that that is certainly not the case (79e7-
80b7). But, perhaps this false identification gives us a certain hint for how to read the 
Platonic dialogues as a whole. For it is only when we cease to be merely perplexed by a 
dialogue,  and instead come to be able to see precisely what in that dialogue is 
perplexing, and to clearly follow out the subtle contours of the argument, that we can 
truly begin to clearly grasp how Socrates' arguments are not merely perplexing, but 
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illuminating of our deepest ignorances, and thereby able to provide a starting point for 
our own independent reflection and investigation.  
 
Secondly, however, I believe that this exhibition ultimately fails to prove that learning is 
recollection; for, in my judgment, it does not at all prove that the boy "recollected" the 
truth of his theorem. For Socrates' proof that the boy is "recollecting" goes something like 
this: (1) the boy was not taught geometry before, so he could not have learned this 
particular theorem in his present life;  (2) Socrates is only asking the boy questions, so he 
cannot be teaching him; (3) but, these questions lead the boy to somehow learn the 
particular theorem that the questions were about. Hence, the questions must have led the 
boy to "learn" the truth by recollecting what he come to know in a previous life. - But of 
course, Socrates' second premise here simply isn't true: for it is possible to teach someone 
by asking them questions. But, isn't this exactly what is happening in the exchange? For 
as we are bound to notice while reading this section, the sequence of Socrates' 
"questions" here, despite their grammatical form, bear a more than striking resemblance 
to a proof of Greek geometry. Further, some of the questions, at least, are hardly even 
"questions" at all - as, for instance, when Socrates asks whether "four times four is 
sixteen," to which the boy "recollects" that the answer is "yes" (83c4-5). Thus, Socrates' 
demonstration does not seem at all to succeed at showing that learning is recollection - as 
Socrates himself appears to admit at that demonstration's conclusion. For by claiming that 
he wouldn't insist very much on the "other points" which he has made (86b8-9), but only 
on a thesis which has no connection to the claim that "learning is recollection" (or to 
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many of the other claims of his earlier "mythic" account), Socrates effectively disclaims 
his acceptance of that thesis entirely - along with the proof on which it supposedly rests 
(86b9-86c2).  
 
But if Socrates does not believe that this proof is demonstrative, then we might 
reasonably wonder why such a lengthy and complicated demonstration is included within 
the dialogue at all. Now, to begin with, I believe that the obvious answer is that this 
speech is primarily rhetorical. For at each point that he makes the claim that learning is 
recollection, Socrates explicitly ties that claim to an encouragement for Meno to resume 
the investigation into what virtue is (81d5-e1; 86b8-c2). But, this suggests that it is 
precisely to overcome Meno's earlier resistance that Socrates has now put forward these 
long and mythic defenses of the very possibility of ever coming to learn what virtue is.  
 
However, I believe that this hardly provides a full account of Plato's inclusion of this 
demonstration. For, even if the purpose is primarily motivational, that hardly seems to 
account for the sheer length and detail with which Plato develops and presents this 
mathematical theorem and its demonstration. Hence, I would instead tentatively suggest 
that the true reason that Plato has included this section is to simply draw his readers 
attention to the elegance and the rigor of these mathematical demonstrations themselves. 
For, as I suggested before, the dialogue's explicit account of how knowledge comes to be 
present may provide the dialogue's implicit answer to the question of how virtue comes to 
be present. But, of course, demonstration is one of the primary ways that a human being 
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can acquire knowledge about each of the beings; and at no other point in the dialogue is 
the true nature of demonstration so clearly exhibited or presented. Hence, I would suggest 
that Plato here may simply be presenting us with a superlative example of the art of 
demonstration, in order that we may see and learn for ourselves how that art helps to 
form a part of how knowledge comes to be present within the human soul. But, perhaps 
there is another reason for this section, as well. For in what preceded, I suggested that 
Socrates was pointing toward the deficiencies of mathematics, or the way that 
mathematical demonstration can often rely upon an abstract and obscure terminology, 
and thereby lack a full awareness or a fully wakeful grasp of the character of the world. 
But perhaps here, by presenting a mathematical presentation that so elegantly begins 
simply from what is visible within the world, Socrates intends to partially rescind and 
correct that earlier suggestion, and show just how a certain kind of mathematics, at least, 
can simply enhance and build upon our awareness of the world, by leading us to discover 
the invisible or hidden relations that were somehow always buried within the world that 
each of us is aware of. Thus, in this way, Socrates' presentation here may show us just 
how mathematics and philosophy can form a truly harmonious and unified bond. 
 
Finally, however, I believe that the most important part of this entire section is given to 
us at the moment of its conclusion. For in the concluding statement of his entire 
complicated and mythic account of human learning, Socrates admits that, with respect to 
all of the "other points" of his original argument, he wouldn't insist very much on their 
behalf (86b8-9); but, he continues, he would  do battle on behalf of one part of that 
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account (81d5-e2). For it is better to try to discover the things that we do not know, and 
we would be worse if we suppose that it's impossible for us to discover these things, or 
that we ought not to investigate them (86b9-c2). Here, then, Socrates suggests that he 
does claim to know something about virtue; for he reveals that what makes us better is 
simply striving to learn, and trying to understand the character of the world - or that true 
virtue is, above all else, rational virtue. But, finally, Socrates also reveals here his 
profound opposition to the view that we "ought not" to inquire; which, in turn, constitutes 
a profound rejection of any "virtue" of simple obedience. Hence, with this deep but 
preliminary statement of Socrates' understanding of the radically philosophic and self-
directed character of virtue, his consideration of the "theory of recollection" has finally 
come to a close. In the process, however, Socrates has deepened his account of how 
knowledge comes to be present within the soul, while also beginning to hint toward his 
own knowledge and answer to the question of what virtue is. What if anything Meno has 
understood of this teaching, of course, remains to be seen; but for us, we have now been 
prepared especially to consider what Socrates himself might know about the character of 
virtue, and how that understanding might shed light on the complexities and the 







VII. Virtue Is Knowledge (86c4 - 89e5) 
 
After having attempted to restore Meno's willingness to investigate what virtue is, 
Socrates will once again ask Meno to join him in a search for the definition of virtue 
itself (86c4-6). But for his part, Meno claims that he would much rather hear the answer 
to the question that he had originally raised - namely, whether virtue is something 
teachable, or whether it comes to be present by nature or in some other way (86c7-86d2). 
- The possibility that virtue comes into being through practice has for some reason been 
silently dropped (contrast 70a1-5 with 86c7-d2). - Socrates, however, makes clear that he 
would much rather investigate what virtue is; but, with some reluctance, he agrees to 
investigate whether virtue is teachable, or what sort of thing virtue is, without yet having 
learned what it is (86d3-86e1). 
 
Now as I mentioned earlier, it is unclear exactly what motivates Socrates to engage in this 
long conversation with Meno; but, this exchange is perhaps the clearest sign that Socrates 
especially wants to converse with Meno about what virtue is, and not how virtue comes 
to be present. Of course, what if anything that suggests about the relative importance of 
these investigations within Socrates' own soul is a different question entirely. But 
however that might be, I believe that Socrates is certainly exaggerating the extent to 
which he is about to abandon the inquiry into what virtue is. For while it is certainly true 
that there is no necessary relation between how something comes to be present and what 
the thing that has come to be present actually is (as I argued earlier in my discussion of 
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Socrates' definition of color), there surely is a connection between what sort of thing 
something is, and what that thing is  (86d9-e1). For the sort of thing that something is 
forms an important part of what it is; just as being-a-figure forms an important part of 
being-a-triangle, and being-an-animal forms an important part of being-a-human-being. 
Hence, so far from it being the case that Socrates will have to abandon the question of 
what virtue is if he discusses the question of what sort of thing it is, it is precisely by 
moving the conversation toward what sort of thing that virtue is that he will be able to 
continue to examine what it is. For after first reducing the question of how virtue comes 
to be present to the question of whether virtue is something teachable, Socrates will next 
reduce the question of whether virtue is something teachable to the question of whether 
virtue is a sort of knowledge. For Socrates will at once secure Meno's agreement that, if 
virtue is knowledge, then it is teachable; and, if it is teachable, then it is knowledge 
(86e1-87c10). But, from these two premises together, Socrates will succeed completely at 
replacing the question of how virtue comes to be present with the question of whether 
virtue is a sort of knowledge. Hence, despite his apparent laments that he is unable to rule 
either himself or Meno, he proves almost at once to be the ruler of them both - and to 
slyly continue his earlier investigation into what virtue is.  
 
Now after having moved the conversation in the direction that he desires, Socrates will at 
once propose that they ought next to examine whether virtue is knowledge, or is 
something different (87c11-12). And Socrates will propose that they test that belief in the 
following way. First, Socrates asks if it "remains" their hypothesis that virtue is 
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something good - referring back to their earlier agreement at 78a6-c1. For his part, Meno 
will agree that this does remain their hypothesis. Next, Socrates proposes that they might 
investigate if virtue is knowledge in the following way: since virtue must be something 
good for us (87d12-87e8), then, if there is nothing good which is other than or separate 
from knowledge, virtue must be knowledge; but, if there is something good which is 
separate from knowledge, then virtue and knowledge might be distinct (87d7-11).  
 
But, we should note at once that there is a certain ambiguity or difficulty in Socrates' 
argument here. For Socrates has claimed that virtue must be knowledge, if there is 
nothing good that is other than knowledge, or if there is nothing good that is separate 
from knowledge. But, while the first of these conditional statements is surely true (if 
virtue is good, and only knowledge is good, then virtue must be knowledge), the second 
conditional is not correct: for even if nothing can be good apart from knowledge, that 
does not mean that there is nothing good that is other than knowledge. For, even if y 
cannot be good apart from x, it is possible that x and y together might be better than x 
alone. But, if x and y together are better than x alone, then y must be good - for whatever 
makes something better through its addition must itself be something good. Hence, even 
if virtue cannot be good apart from knowledge, it would still be possible that virtue is a 
good which is other than knowledge. - Or, perhaps, to make the same point more 
cautiously, it does not prove that virtue as a whole is knowledge. For while some part of 
virtue might be knowledge, there might nevertheless be a different part - boldness, for 
example (88b2-7) - which is a good that is other than knowledge, while forming an 
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indispensable condition for the presence of virtue as a whole. And perhaps just such a 
consideration as this leads Socrates to ultimately conclude that prudence is either the 
whole, or a part, of virtue (89a4-5); for it is certainly more plausible to say that nothing is 
good apart from knowledge, than it is to say that nothing is good except for knowledge. 
 
Yet, it is difficult to see how either of Socrates' arguments here could possibly be the case 
- either that nothing is good other than knowledge, or that nothing is good apart from 
knowledge. For Socrates' argument for both of these positions amounts to the claim that 
each other good, such as health and money, is sometimes beneficial, and sometimes 
harmful; but that, when knowledge is present, it is beneficial, and when knowledge is 
absent, then it is harmful  (87e7-88a7; 88c6-89a1). But, this certainly does not seem to 
establish that only knowledge is good. For even if it is the case that health is only 
beneficial when it is accompanied by knowledge, it is surely better to have knowledge 
and be healthy than to have knowledge and be sick; which means, of course, that health 
must at least be a good that is other than knowledge, even if it cannot be good apart from 
knowledge. But, secondly, it hardly seems to be true that nothing can be good apart from 
knowledge, or that all of our undertakings turn out well then they are done prudently, and 
badly when they are done imprudently (88c6-8). For to begin with, don't some of our 
imprudent decisions end up being to our own advantage? For instance, aren't all reckless 
gambles necessarily foolish and imprudent; but don't some reckless gambles, at least, 
work out in our favor? Likewise, don't we always run the risk of suffering a grave loss 
even the most apparently safe and prudent course of action, for the simple fact that none 
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of us can ever perfectly predict the consequences of our actions? But then, just as an 
imprudent action would not necessarily make us miserable, neither would a prudent 
action necessarily lead us to attain the good that we are seeking. For at best, prudence can 
maximize our chances of being happy, while imprudence can maximize our chances of 
being miserable; but neither is able to circumvent the power of chance entirely.  
 
It would seem, then, that even the more limited view that nothing can be good apart from 
knowledge simply ignores the fact that chance plays an essential and a necessary role in 
determining the outcomes of all of our actions. Yet, perhaps to our surprise, Socrates 
himself will make this exact point later on in the dialogue. For Socrates will later admit 
that, while knowledge may be responsible for guiding our actions correctly, it is also the 
case that not everything occurs through human guidance - for some things occur as a 
result of chance (99a1-4). Hence, there is no necessary connection between the way that 
we guide our lives, and the outcomes or the happiness that we are seeking for. But then, if 
Socrates knows that even the claim that nothing is good apart from knowledge is not 
correct, then what is his intention in putting forward this proof that virtue must be 
knowledge, either in whole or in part?  
 
To begin with, while I believe that the goodness of prudence is certainly being 
exaggerated, and that the proof that virtue is knowledge is doubtlessly invalid, I don't 
believe that means that virtue is not a sort of knowledge - for of course, a true conclusion 
can be derived from faulty premises. Hence, I would tentatively suggest that the view that 
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virtue is knowledge may be Socrates' serious opinion. For after all, the chief question of 
the dialogue so far has been what actually distinguishes an excellent human being from a 
base or wretched one. But isn't it at least plausible to suggest that it might be knowledge 
which provides this distinction? For of course, we often say that someone who acts 
unjustly is very foolish or ignorant; while, if somebody conducts their lives in an 
extraordinarily just manner - like Christ and Lincoln - we often say that they are wise, 
and understood how to live. Likewise, we say that the virtuous are happy, while the 
vicious are miserable; but, if Socrates is correct that no one wants to be miserable (78a6-
b2), then wouldn't the vicious cease to be vicious if they ceased to be ignorant? Finally, 
when somebody lives a dissolute or a base life, we often hope that they will "learn" to act 
in a better way; and this, too, suggests that virtue may be a certain sort of knowledge. But 
if that is the case, then knowledge would be the true form of virtue which Socrates and 
Meno had been searching for; and hence, it would only be through the presence of 
knowledge that each virtue would become a virtue (88a9-88c4).  
 
Of course, even if we accept the truth of this account (as it is not clear to me that we 
ought to do), we would still be left with a number of difficulties. For, to begin with, even 
if virtue is a sort of knowledge, virtue is obviously not the same as knowledge simply: for 
surely the knowledge that it is raining, for instance, or that 2 + 2 = 4, does not make one 
an excellent human being. But then, if virtue is one kind of knowledge among many, 
what exactly is virtue a knowledge of? Further, one may wonder whether our answer to 
that question would allow us to preserve a "multiplicity" of virtues. For it seems to me to 
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be unlikely that courage is knowledge of one thing, while moderation is a knowledge of 
another. Rather, it seems more likely that each is comprised of a single knowledge;  
whatever, precisely, that knowledge might be of. But then, it would follow that there 
would not be so much a multiplicity of virtues, as a multiplicity of parts of virtue - parts 
such as "boldness," for instance (88b4-7) - of which knowledge would form the stable 
and solid core (88b2-88c4). But of course,  more fundamentally, it would remain for us to 
test this hypothesis that "virtue is knowledge" for ourselves; for, since the argument 
which Socrates has given for this claim is surely invalid, we are compelled to turn toward 
our own experience and reasoning in order to determine the truth of this strange but 
somehow plausible answer to the question of what virtue is. 
 
At this point, then, Socrates has now persuaded Meno – at least for the moment – that 
virtue is knowledge (89c2-4). But, in the sequel, Socrates will begin to call that claim into 
question. For he will first re-affirm their previous agreement that, if virtue is knowledge, 
then it must be something teachable (89c5-89d6). On this basis, however, he will begin to 
question whether virtue is knowledge. For Socrates will argue that, if virtue is teachable, 
it must have students and teachers; but, if it does not have students and teachers, then it 
cannot be teachable (89d7-89e3). Thus, the question of whether or not virtue is 
knowledge becomes reduced to the question of whether or not there are students and 
teachers of virtue.  
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Now, I believe that Socrates' arguments are correct if they are taken in one sense, but 
incorrect if they are taken in another. For, if a thing will necessarily never be taught, then 
it seems to me that it cannot be "teachable;" just as a thing that will necessarily never be 
perceived is not "perceivable," and a thing that will necessarily never be thought is not 
"thinkable." But, if Socrates means that virtue is not teachable because it does not 
currently have any students and teachers, then this is certainly false. For surely a 
mathematical truth is teachable even before it has any students or teachers. For, if it was 
not, then how could something which was not teachable ever come to be taught at a later 
time? Thus, even if there are no students or teachers of virtue at the moment, that would 
not yet imply anything about whether or not virtue is teachable. 
 
But it seems to me that we might also be surprised simply to see that Socrates is raising 
the question of the teachability of virtue at all. For of course, in what preceded, Socrates 
had quickly moved past the question of virtue's teachability, in order to focus directly 
upon the question of what sort of thing that virtue is (87b3-c12); which seemed to 
suggest, as I had argued before, that Socrates wished especially to converse about the 
question of what virtue is. But now, by moving the inquiry to the question of whether 
there are any students or teachers of virtue, and by doing so in accordance with the 
questionable premises or arguments that we have just seen before, Socrates seems to have 
left the question of what virtue is behind entirely. But, I believe that the reason for this 
alteration will become clear almost at once at the beginning of the next section; and that, 
through the change that is about to take place within the action of the Meno, the most 
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fundamental and important parts of the dialogue -  the sustained and continued inquiry 
into what virtue is, and how knowledge comes to be present - have now begun to come to 



















VIII. Students And Teachers (89e6 - 96d1) 
 
As we saw in what came before, Socrates had effectively turned the dialogue into an 
inquiry into whether or not there are students and teachers of virtue. His reasons for doing 
that, however, had been quite obscure; but, in the sequel, his reasons will become clear at 
once. For at this point in the dialogue, Anytus, one of Socrates' future accusers, will come 
and sit down with, his ancestral guest-friend (90b5-6); and accordingly, from this point 
on, the entire conversation will be conducted in the presence of the highly conservative 
and volatile Anytus (99e1-2; 92a7-92c6). But this in turn leads to the consequence that 
the question of "what is virtue" will be dropped entirely, and will never be brought up 
again at any later point in the dialogue. Indeed, the omission of this question proves to be 
so complete, that Socrates even conceals that he and Meno had been discussing it before. 
For Socrates will suggest that he and Meno had been conversing, for a long time now, 
about how Meno could become proficient in conventional Athenian virtue; and that "this" 
virtue is what Meno had been seeking to acquire (90e8-91b5). But of course, in addition 
to entirely ignoring the entire inquiry into what virtue is, this sanitized description also 
ascribes a desire for conventional virtue Meno that he had simply never expressed 
(compare especially 90e8-91b5 with 71e1-7 and 73c9-d1). Thus, it is the presence of 
Anytus that seems to necessitate the abandonment of the inquiry into what virtue is; and, 
accordingly, it is not surprising that, after being compelled to lower the subject of the 
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inquiry in this way, Socrates will soon declare that it's time for him to be "off 
somewhere" (100b7).  
 
Now, this sudden reticence of Socrates may help us to cast the entire preceding dialogue 
into its proper light. For as the conversation with Anytus reveals at once, there is a simple 
and commonsensical answer to the question of what virtue is, which is likely to be put by 
authorities such as Anytus: virtue is to nobly care for the good of one's family and one's 
city (91a2-6). This answer to the question, of course, is likely to be an answer that both 
Socrates and Meno have heard many times; and further, it is likely to be a teaching that 
we, too, have heard before. But this means that the entire inquiry into what virtue is has 
to somehow begin with some intuition or awareness that such an answer cannot possibly 
be complete, or has to be modified in some important way. Now, as we have seen 
throughout the dialogue, that intuition need hardly be an adequate one. For surely part of 
what motivates Meno to reject this answer is simply his misguided understanding of his 
own deepest good (73c7-d1; 78c4-78d2). However, I believe that Socrates has also 
prepared us for this confrontation with Anytus's views by revealing some of the most 
powerful reasons to reject this account of virtue. For by reminding us of the simple and 
all-important fact that each of us wish to be happy (78a6-78b2), while also pointing 
towards the critical role that knowledge must play in all genuine virtue (88c6-8), I believe 
that Socrates has quietly gestured toward some essential elements of true virtue that 
Anytus's account either insufficiently emphasizes, or else lacks altogether. It will hardly 
be surprising, then, that Anytus's conception of virtue is compatible with his desire to 
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punish those whom he does not know at all (91c1-92c5) - and that it will be compatible, 
finally, with his bringing the charges which lead to the trial and the death of Socrates. 
Hence, the rejection of what such a man as Anytus believes to be virtue is bound to 
appear, to Anytus at least, as a sign of the greatest wickedness and vice. Hence, Socrates' 
great need to conceal his investigations from Anytus, to the greatest extent that he is able. 
 
But, having concealed the true character of his conversation with Meno, Socrates will 
now invite Anytus to join with him into an investigation into who the teachers of virtue 
are (90b5-6). And he begins, innocently enough, by securing Anytus's assent that, if they 
wanted Meno to become a good physician, they would send him to the physicians; and 
that, if they wanted him to be a good shoemaker, they would send him to the shoemakers 
- and so on with aulos-playing, and each of the other arts (90b6-90e1). For in general, 
Socrates concludes, we should send each student to those who claim to teach it, and who 
take money for their services (90e1-6; 90d1-4). But on this apparently reasonable basis, 
Socrates will conclude that, if he and Anytus wish to make Meno into a good man, then 
they ought to send him to those who teach virtue, and who accept pay for their teaching. 
In other words: they ought to send him to learn from those who are called the "Sophists" 
(90e7-91b8).  
 
Now of course, this argument is somewhat problematic. For it hardly follows from the 
fact that someone claims or especially "pretends" to teach a subject that they are a 
suitable teacher of the subject matter in question (90e1-6, esp. 90e4).  Nor, as Socrates' 
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whole life makes clear, must one accept money in order to be a gifted teacher (90e3). 
But, I believe that there is also a much deeper problem with Socrates' argument here. For 
from the fact that the Sophists claim to teach virtue, it hardly follows that they teach 
"this" virtue - or that they teach the conventional and political virtue which a man of 
Anytus's character looks up to and admires (91a2-b1). And accordingly, we are not 
surprised to find that Anytus will view the suggestion that he should send Meno to the 
Sophists as madness itself (91c1-4). For Anytus views these men as being manifestly the 
ruin and the corruption of all of the young with whom they associate. 
 
But while Socrates will attempt to provide some defense of his claim that the Sophists are 
competent teachers of virtue (91c5-92a6), that defense will hardly prove to be adequate. 
For, first, Socrates suggests that someone who charges a fee for their services would 
surely be driven out of the city if they harmed those who paid them money (91c5-e5). Yet 
of course, don't quite a few merchants make a truly considerable profit by selling goods 
that are ultimately harmful to those who foolishly purchase them - fast food companies, 
for instance? But, secondly, he suggests that, if a Sophist like Protagoras had truly 
harmed others, they could not have escaped the notice of all of Greece for forty years, 
and continue to be thought well of to this day (91e2-92a2). But, given that it is widely 
reported that Protagoras died in the process of fleeing a charge of impiety, and given 
Anytus's own views of the man (and his evident power to bring harm to his enemies), it 
hardly seems to be correct to say that he escaped the notice of all of Greece. Perhaps, 
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then, Socrates has some special interest in securing the reputation of the Sophists; but, 
what that interest might be, precisely, seems difficult to say.  
 
But after making this somewhat questionable defense, Socrates simply continues by 
asking Anytus whether he believes that the Sophists are mad, or that they know that they 
are harming the young (92a3-6). Anytus, for his part, at once confirms that they do know, 
and that they are far from being mad (92a7-92b3) - a pointer, perhaps, to Plato's general 
understanding of anger. Next, Socrates attempts to discern the source of Anytus's anger, 
by asking him if Anytus himself has been done any injustice by the Sophists (92b4-5). 
But Anytus reveals that he is so far from having been done any injustice himself, that he 
is completely without experience of these men altogether - even though he certainly 
knows who they are (92b6-c5). Socrates concludes by admiringly suggesting that Anytus 
must then be a "prophet" (92c6-7); and this, I think, reveals something to us of the 
character of Socrates' future accuser.  
 
But, having put forward the claim that the Sophists are suitable teachers in order to bring 
out and examine the character of Anytus's anger, Socrates will go on to simply ask 
Anytus who he believes that the teachers of virtue are(92c8-d5). And, after some 
resistance, Anytus will answer that there isn't a single one of the Athenian gentlemen who 
won't help to make Meno better with respect to virtue - if, at any rate, he's willing to obey 
them (92e3-6). - One wonders precisely how such "obedience" relates to their capacity as 
teachers. It might be, of course, that they simply require docility and obedience in order 
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to teach their students what virtue is; but it seems just as likely that a certain "obedience" 
forms an essential ingredient in the virtue which they teach, and in Anytus's conception 
of virtue as well (as is also indicated by his earlier suggestion that a certain course of 
action is not only "irrational," but also "ignorant"). And I believe that this likely points to 
a serious alternative to Socrates' claim that virtue is a sort of knowledge.  
 
But however that might be, Socrates next confirms that Anytus believes that many good 
men have come to be within the city, and that each learned how to be a good man from 
his predecessors (92e3-93a4). Socrates, of course, does not point out the infinite regress 
that this might imply. Instead, he simply agrees that men who are good at the political 
things are in the city now, and that no fewer men of this sort existed in the past (93a5-7).  
He does not answer Anytus's question of whether many good men have come to be in the 
city, nor does he offer any suggestion about whether the number of men who are good at 
the political things might be declining over time (93a3-7). Instead, Socrates will go on to 
remind Anytus that the conversation is not about whether there have been good men in 
the city, but about whether these men have been good teachers of their virtue (93a7-b7).  
 
But this will lead Socrates to now attempt to provide a long proof that those Athenians 
who are conventionally recognized for their virtue have not been very skilled as teachers 
(93b8-94e2). For in each case, Socrates argues, these men surely wished for good things 
for their sons, and they surely spared no expense to have their sons taught by the best 
teachers available; but, in each case, their sons did not acquire outstanding virtue 
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themselves, and in some cases may have even fallen below the ordinary level of decency. 
Hence, Socrates concludes, it may be the case that none of these men are teachers of 
virtue; for virtue, ultimately, may not be something teachable.  
 
Yet, a number of small details scattered throughout this proof suffice to raise serious 
difficulties with Socrates' assertions. For to begin with, Socrates suggests that each of 
these men wished for their children to turn out as well as possible. Yet, don't they clearly 
also wish, as each of their lives make clear, to dedicate themselves to the actions of virtue 
- and doesn't this mean that they will spend almost all of their time paying attention to the 
affairs of the city (94d9-e1)? Hence, even if they of course wish for their children to turn 
out well, they may not have the time to ensure that they actually do so. But of course, it 
may be precisely this lack of leisure that causes each of these men to have their sons 
taught, rather than to teach their sons themselves. Thus, this argument hardly seems to 
establish that these men couldn't have been teachers of virtue, if they had wanted to be - 
as Anytus himself points out (93c3-5). 
 
But, further, a more important and fundamental consideration is omitted from this entire 
discussion. For Socrates simply dismisses without comment the possibility that the nature 
of one of these men's sons might have been poor (93d9-10). Yet, isn't there of course an 
enormous difference in the natures which each of us possess? And doesn't this suggest, in 
turn, that each of us may admit of attaining virtue to a very different degree - such that it 
is simply impossible for the highest forms of virtue to be attained by everyone? For while 
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ordinary decency might well be teachable, it hardly seems likely that each of us could 
acquire the extraordinary gifts and virtues of a Lincoln, or a Washington. Likewise, if 
virtue is knowledge, as Socrates suggests, then differences in our natural faculties are 
bound to affect how fully we are able to understand the world, or how virtuous each of us 
can become. Thus, here, too, Socrates' proof seems to be simply inadequate, and to leave 
out a decisive consideration about the way that virtue can be taught or learned.  
 
But after or through presenting this proof, Socrates' conversation with Anytus comes to a 
close. For Anytus, having been infuriated by Socrates, either threatens or warns him 
about the kind of punishment that his inquiries might bring (94e3-95a1); while Socrates, 
for his part, coyly suggests that Anytus will cease to be angry, once he realizes what 
"speaking badly" truly means (95a2-6). But, while Anytus will continue to sit in anger by 
Meno's side (99e2) for the rest of the dialogue, Socrates simply ignores him for the 
remainder of the dialogue, and returns to his discussion with Meno about the students and 
teachers of virtue. In returning to that conversation, Socrates will first suggest that all of 
the political men - including, somewhat surprisingly, Meno himself (95c9-10) - are in 
contradiction about whether or not virtue is teachable (95a7-96a4). However, no one who 
is in contradiction about whether virtue can be taught could possibly be a teacher of 
virtue (96b2-7). But secondly, neither are the Sophists teachers of virtue - for all, at any 
rate, agree that they are worthless (96a6-b2). But, if neither the Sophists nor the 
gentlemen are teachers of virtue, there could be no teachers at all; and, accordingly, it 
follows that virtue is not something teachable (96b8-d3). 
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Now of course, this proof is problematic. For, first, no real argument is given that the 
Sophists are not teachers of virtue. And, secondly, no argument is given that only the 
gentlemen or the Sophists could be teachers of virtue. For it is not so clear that Socrates, 
for instance, falls within either of these classes, or is not a teacher of virtue. Perhaps, 
then, this "proof" was not even meant to be conclusive, but only to serve the function that 
it does in fact prove to serve - preparing the grounds for Socrates to offer Meno and 
Anytus with a radically different conception of how to understand the relation between 
virtue and knowledge. But this means, of course, that Socrates' grounds for abandoning 
his earlier claim that virtue is knowledge hardly prove to be adequate at all; and this 
means, in turn, that he may not have given us any solid reason to abandon that claim at 
all. (As for the the lines of Theognis that Socrates quotes here - 95c9-96a2 - it seems to 
me to be to difficult to say exactly what contradiction they reveal. But, perhaps the 
difficulty that Socrates has in mind is their shifting answer to the question of whether 
virtue is ultimately dependent on knowledge, or whether it is ultimately dependent on 
obedience. And this, in turn, might point back toward what we have already seen in 
Socrates' conversation with Anytus, along with the entire alternative ways of life that 
Socrates has held up for us before - 92e3-6 and 81a10-e2). 
 
At this point, however, the examination of the students and teachers of virtue has reached 
its conclusion. It remains now only to see what last teaching about virtue Socrates might 
offer to Meno and Anytus, and how this final section might elaborate on or challenge his 
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previous assertion that virtue is a sort of knowledge. With that completed, however, our 






















IX. Virtue Is True Opinion (96d1 - 100c1) 
 
Now in what came before, Socrates had concluded that there are no students or teachers 
of virtue; and, on this basis, he suggests that virtue cannot be teachable. Of course, this 
would seem to implicitly suggest, based on their earlier agreements (89d3-6; 87c1-3), that 
virtue is not a kind of knowledge. Accordingly, Socrates will now introduce an entirely 
new answer to the question of what virtue is. For Socrates will say that, in spite of what 
they had agreed to before, we do not need prudence in order to guide our lives correctly 
(96d4-97a8). For as Socrates now points out, anyone who correctly opines "the path to 
Larissa," or the way to any goal whatsoever, is no worse of a guide than someone who 
knows the way in question (97a9-97b10). But this means, then, that true opinion is no 
worse a guide for our action than knowledge itself; and Socrates suggests that this is just 
what had been left out of their earlier agreement that virtue is a sort of knowledge 
(97b11-97c2).  
 
Now to begin with, I would suggest that Socrates' argument here is simply correct. For if 
somebody holds an opinion about how to reach a certain goal, and if that opinion is 
correct, then they would be no better at reaching the goal in question if their true opinion 
was transformed into knowledge. Of course, it does remain true that Socrates will call 
this argument into question in what follows. For Socrates will suggest, since our opinions 
are always in a state of constant flux, they can never provide a stable guide for our 
actions. Yet, I believe that this argument fails to actually prove that knowledge is of any 
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greater utility than true opinion for guiding our actions. For, first, even if our opinions are 
in a state of continual flux, that would in no way change the fact that whoever holds a 
correct opinion will act well, for so long as they hold the opinion in question (97c6-11). 
Hence, even if all true opinions are in a state of flux, that would say nothing about their 
value during the time in which they are held. But, second, I don't believe that it actually is 
the case that our opinions are in such a state of ceaseless flux, that they can provide no 
stable guidance for our actions. For after all, isn't it the case that we do possess certain 
wondrously stable opinions, which provide a foundation and a basis for all of our human 
actions - such, for instance, as our belief in the existence of an external world? For 
without this entirely blind and unyielding "trust," there would be no possibility for human 
action.  
 
Now at this point, someone might disagree that the belief in question is an opinion, rather 
than knowledge. But, perhaps that alone is enough to make the importance of this section 
evident. For while Socrates had argued before that virtue is prudence (89a4-5), and that 
virtue is knowledge (87d7-11), he had not actually provided any argument that prudence 
is a kind of knowledge. Indeed, in his entire argument that virtue is a sort of knowledge 
87d7-89a5, he had proved to be remarkably loose about virtue actually is - almost 
randomly switching between identifying it with "knowledge," "prudence," "intellect," and 
"good sense." But this means, of course, that he had ignored the question of whether 
prudence is simply knowledge, or whether the kind of cognition which guides our actions 
is truly understood as a kind of knowledge, or a kind of opinion, or a synthesis of the two. 
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Thus, Socrates' argument provides an important addition to what he had suggested 
before, and a clear pointer to the need to adequately determine the precise distinction 
between "knowledge" and "opinion." For of course, without being able to say precisely 
what knowledge is, or how it is distinguished from mere opinion, one can hardly be 
certain that virtue is knowledge, rather than opinion.  
 
But if Socrates' explicit argument against the identification of true opinion with virtue has 
proven to be inadequate, perhaps a deeper or a stronger ground for rejecting that claim 
may be indicated more quietly in what came before. For to begin with, Socrates had 
suggested that the man who opines the path to Larissa, or the way toward any goal 
whatever, would be just as able to guide our affairs as the man who knows the path in 
question (97a10-97b9). But of course, this argument was entirely silent as to what place 
we should go - and whether the man with true opinion is as skilled at determining the 
goal as the man with knowledge. Likewise, a little later, Socrates will say that true 
opinion is no worse than knowledge at completing "the task belonging to each action" 
(98b8-10). But again, Socrates is silent as to whether it is true opinion or knowledge that 
actually determines what that "task" is, or that determines what kind of action we should 
undertake. Perhaps, then, if we put these indications together with the entire drama of the 
Meno, we may come to appreciate the deepest reason that true opinion is not sufficient as 
a guide for action - even if it might form a necessary and important part. For as we have 
already seen, the deepest source for Meno's perplexity or confusion about the character of 
virtue is his perplexity or confusion about the fundamental goal or goals of all human 
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action. In other words, by being unable to even see the distinction between the noble and 
the good, much less to determine the relation between them, Meno has proved unable to 
determine what virtue actually is. And in this way, Meno has shown that he is unable to 
hold a stable true opinion about virtue - however much he might hold stable true opinions 
about other aspects of his world. But I believe that with regard to a matter like virtue, at 
least, we are all bound to find ourselves in a condition such as this - if, at least, we have 
not come to discover and to know the true character of virtue itself. For without acquiring 
such knowledge, it will inevitably be the case that the "true opinions" which we rely on 
will prove to be little more than "recollections" of the authoritative views of our own time 
and place - authoritative views which, in their crudity and thoughtlessness, we have just 
seen powerfully dramatized in Anytus. And it is perhaps his awareness of this basic fact 
of our situation that will lead Socrates to launch the attack upon true opinion that he does. 
For after acknowledging that it he doesn't know whether all of our opinions are in flux, 
he will go on to add that he is not just conjecturing that knowledge is something different 
from correct opinion. For he will affirm that this distinction, at least, is one of the few 
things which he would truly claim to know (98b1-6). This concluding argument, then, 
with great simplicity and elegance, succeeds at affirming the depths of Socrates' 
awareness of the limits of his knowledge, while pointing to one item of critical 
importance within his limited understanding – the distinction between knowledge and 
correct opinion. For while Socrates had seemed to use "correct opinion" and "true 
opinion" almost interchangeably, his concluding remarks here suggest that it is especially 
"correct" opinion that was somehow the target of his earlier critiques. For however much 
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these authoritative and "correct" opinions might differ from one another, they are bound, 
I believe, to share certain features in common; and to be united, ultimately, in a lack of 
awareness of the true richness and complexity of our human situation. Thus, without first 
attempting to free ourselves from these "correct" opinions, and to direct ourselves 
towards that which our hearts most deeply desire, there is hardly any way to rely upon 
what we recognize to be our "true opinions," without succumbing to opinions that are 
deeply false and misguided. Hence, for this reason alone, then, it becomes of critical 
importance to strive to escape from what merely seems to be a "true opinion," and to 
actively and energetically strive in the pursuit of true and sufficient knowledge - however 
much it might also be the case, in the final analysis, that a certain more natural kind of 
true opinion forms an irreducible and essential part of our lives and of our actions.  
 
But at this point, Socrates will go on to apply these considerations about the practical 
utility of true opinion to the basic or fundamental question of the dialogue. For, he will 
first remind Meno of what they have already agreed to at this point:  (1) that, if virtue is 
knowledge, then it is teachable; (2) that, if it is teachable, it must have students and 
teachers; (3) that, it does not have students or teachers; (4) that, additionally, virtue must 
be good; (5) that, in order to be good, virtue must guide our actions; (6) and that, finally, 
only knowledge and true opinion are guides for our actions  (98d7-99a6). But, Socrates 
next begins to draw the necessary conclusion: since virtue has no teachers or students, it 
cannot be teachable, and hence, it cannot be knowledge (99a7-8). Hence, of the two 
things that are good and advantageous, only one remains (99b1-3). But then, it must not 
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be knowledge that is a guide in political action, nor can it be through wisdom that 
Themistocles and the others used to guide the cities; but, rather, their virtue must have 
been a certain kind of "good opinion" (99b1-99c1). For, just as the soothsayers say many 
divine and inspired things, but know nothing of what they say, so too do the political men 
succeed at speaking about many great matters, while knowing nothing of what they are 
speaking of (99c1-99d6). 
 
But after giving this final account of what virtue is, Socrates will also given an explicit 
answer to the question that Meno had presented him with at the very beginning of our 
dialogue. For virtue, Socrates now says, is a certain kind of correct opinion, 
unaccompanied by intellect or knowledge; which means, finally, that virtue comes to be 
present - in those in whom it does come to be present - by an act of divine dispensation 
(99e4-100a1). But, rather than simply present this final account of virtue to Meno and 
Anytus, Socrates will instead point, once again, to a very different conception of virtue. 
For in opposition to the divinely inspired statesmen, Socrates suggests that perhaps there 
might be a sort of political man who is able to make another skilled in politics as well 
(99e4-100a3). If such a man existed, Socrates suggests, he would almost be like a 
substance in comparison to shadows (100a3-100b1); for, he alone would be possessed of 




It would seem, then, that Socrates is unwilling to seriously accept that those who are 
merely "inspired" are actually virtuous men. For Socrates here makes clear that, in his 
opinion, true virtues requires the presence of a kind of knowledge or understanding which 
most political men simply don't possess. For as we have already seen from his 
conversation with one such political man, the kind of education given by the gentlemen 
within the cities is hardly sufficient to confer a truly coherent or "wakeful" awareness of 
what virtue truly is. Our dialogue, then, must remain incomplete: for the explicit account 
of how virtue comes to be present which Socrates has here provided - as opposed to the 
implicit accounts of how we acquire knowledge which he has provided throughout the 
dialogue (74b3-77a5; 80d5-86c2) - is not a view which he seriously holds. Hence, 
without agreeing about what virtue is - as he and Meno clearly have not done - they can 
hardly agree about how virtue comes to be present, or about virtue's ultimate foundations 
(100b2-7).  
 
But, at this point, Socrates realizes that it's now time for him to be off (100b8). As for 
Anytus, Socrates suggests that, if Meno can persuade him that virtue is true opinion, he 
will certainly be gentler. And finally, Socrates adds, if you do persuade him, and soothe 
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